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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study was to research the potential of standardization of equipment,
components and modules as a means for reducing the costs associated with shipbuilding,
particularly the costs associated with Navy acquisition and construction. This study built upon
both prior and contemporary research into standardization within the Navy, other military
activities and commercial industry. The potential impacts of standardization upon acquisition
costs, life cycle costs, construction costs, time to delivery, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial
base were studied. Methods for determining the appropriate degree of standardization (within
a ship, a class or the fleet) and the type of standard (equipment, component or large module)
were analyzed. Means for identifying and prioritizing standardization candidates were
presented and discussed.
Standardization was found to have considerable potential for reducing the costs associated with
Navy acquistion and construction. Maximizing the use of common structure and components
throughout a ship's architecture and within a class were found to be potentially very effective.
Many of the benefits of standardization could be achieved by utilizing standard interfaces for
mounting equipment and by placing constraints on equipment geometries and dimensions.
Standardization decisions and policies require several challenges to be met. Among these are
the development of a set of criteria by which to judge the merits of standardization projects, the
development of a detailed database of statistics regarding naval equipment and components, the
development of flexible designs, detailed up front production planning, and a detailed
understanding of legal and contractual roadblocks.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Henry S. Marcus
NAVSEA Professor of Ship Acquisition
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Today the Navy is faced with a budget which is decreasing, costs which are increasing
and a diminishing U.S. industrial base. The Navy must strive harder than ever before to
reduce the costs associated with naval ship design, production, acquisition and operation.
Methods to reduce the total cost of ownership must be developed and implemented. Figures
1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate some alarming U.S. shipbuilding trends. As Navy
construction slows down and commercial work continues to be nearly non-existent, the
situation could get considerably worse without successful efforts to improve the ship design,
acquisition and production processes.
Figure 1.0 - The Increasing Costs of Surface Combatantsl
1 Figure from NAVSEA 070-05R-TN-004, May 1993
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Figure 1.1 - A Shrinking Navy2
2 Figure from NAVSEA #004, May 1993
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3 Figure supplied by the Shipbuilder's Council of America
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Figure 1.3 - A Diminishing Shipbuilding Industrial Base4
Figure from NAVSEA #004, May 1993
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As the title of this thesis suggests, the objective of this study was to research the role of
standardization in shipbuilding, particularly the role of naval equipment and component
standardization in naval shipbuilding and acquisition. In 1952, Congress enacted the Defense
Cataloging and Standardization Act. The language of the law reads as follows:
"It shall be the duty of each military department to achieve the highest
practicable degree possible in the standardization of items used throughout
the Department of Defense through the reduction of the number of sizes,
kinds or types of generally similar items."
This law remains the statutory charter of the DOD Standardization program. High level
interest in affordability has focused attention upon the standardization effort as a means to
achieve significant cost savings, and efforts are underway to review and improve this process.
The Secretary of Defense intensified interest in the standardization program by proliferating the
"Defense Management Report" in 1989.
This report sets forth a plan in response to the President's directive to improve the
acquisition system and effectively manage defense resources. Three broad recommendations
came out of that process improvement study:
1. The preferred procurement of previously developed items currently in use by
the government.
2. Systematically reduce DOD inventories by minimizing new item entries and
reducing the number of items in the system.
3. Strengthen the defense industrial base by drawing upon established product lines of
marine equipment manufacturers to encourage their continued participation in the
market.
- 16-
The Department of Defense defines standardization as:
"...the process by which the DOD achieves the closest cooperation among
services and agencies for the most effective use of research, development
and production resources and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis
the use of:
a. common or comparable operational, administrative and logistical
procedures
b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria
c. common, compatible or interchangeable supplies, components,
weapons or equipment.
d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding
organizational compatibility."
This thesis is most concerned with C, and related issues regarding A&B. There should
be four broad elements to a program aimed at improving the Naval Acquisition process. These
elements include:
• Reducing Acquisition Costs
* Reducing Life Cycle Costs
* Reducing time to delivery
* Bolstering the U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Base
This study will review the role of standardization in shipbuilding. The ways in which
standardization of naval equipment and components at both the equipment and ship module
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levels can be beneficial in these four areas will be explored. The principal objective of this
research was to examine the appropriate degree of, and approach to, standardization as well as
to develop criteria for prioritizing candidates for standardization. Processes and approaches
which may prove effective in dealing with the standardization function will be studied and
suggested. Tools for trade-off studies, candidate selection and implementing standardization
towards these ends will be reviewed and proposed.
This research has not been conducted in a vacuum, and builds upon previous and
current work in this area. Many industries and organizations, including the Navy, have
conducted research and developed tools for the application of standards and standard
equipment and components. The Naval Sea Logistics Center (NAVSEALOGCEN) has done a
great deal of work in this area which serves as an excellent starting point. Among the tools
they have developed are:
* ILS Cost Algorithm - a cost estimating technique for use in trade-off studies
Data Ownership Analysis - a trade-off methodology to help determine when
there is value to purchase data ownership rights for equipment.
Standardization Candidate Criteria Model - a methodology for selecting
equipment to be standardized.
HM&E Data Research System - a database of equipment supported in
the Navy fleet
* 3M database - database of maintenance records and information
- 18-
The utility of these and other tools will be discussed. Prior successes in
standardization of naval equipment and other industries will be studied. A broad review across
equipment categories will be conducted to demonstrate that opportunities for savings through
standardization exist. Modularity will be studied as a means of reducing construction costs and
time to delivery. The integration of standard components and modules will be discussed.
Many of the design constraints which must be considered in developing these modules will be
presented. The impact of standardization and modularity upon design and the acquisition
process will be reviewed.
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CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF
STANDARDIZATION IN SHIPBUILDING
Standardization, with regard to shipbuilding, is the broad term used to describe a
methodology by which the number of unique guidelines, procedures, processes, drawings,
documents or physical parts, components and equipment necessary to manufacture, operate
and maintain a vessel is minimized. The principal objective is to reduce Acquisition Costs,
Production Costs, Life Cycle Costs, and Time to Delivery. It is also hoped that the wise
application of standards would help bolster the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The benefits
of standardization programs are numerous and documented in many industries such as the
automotive, electronics and aerospace industries. Standards are used successfully in foreign
shipbuilding, particularly in Japan and Germany. The Aerospace Industries Association of
America, in its National Aerospace Standard 1524, identifies savings attributable to
engineering, procurement, quality control, inventory management, production, maintenance
and general improvements. These savings are applicable to ship systems as well. Some
benefits may be quantified with hard data, others are more intangible benefits. Some benefits
which may be attributable to standardization include5:
ENGINEERING
· Reduce technical time in processing product design
* Reuse known items improves reliability and reduces "debugging"
· Reduce hazard of technical error in judgment
· Increase time available for work requiring special design or handling
· Reduce errors arising from miscommunication between engineers, draftsmen, production
etc.
5 List compiled from NAS 1524 and other sources
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· Reduce "break-in" time for new technical personnel
* Reduce the need for minor supervisory decisions
* Reduce the need for waivers and non-standard part testing and approval
· Reduce redesign and redrafting effort
* Improve interchangeability of parts, designs, packages etc.
· Promote the use of improved methods and products
* Help eliminate unsound practices based on prejudice, tradition, advertising etc.
· Facilitate the development of cost estimating techniques
· Facilitate and speed the delivery of critical information
PROCUREMENT
Increase purchasing power through procurement of larger quantities of fewer items
* Reduce the number of purchase orders, receipts and payments
* Reduce lead time
* Provide a common language between buyer and seller reducing time required for
negotiations
· Facilitate the formation of quality partnerships with vendors which lead to just in time
delivery
* Use standard dimensions, interfaces and design requirements to help put all suppliers on a
fair competitive basis
Promote purchase by intrinsic value rather than sales-pitch
* Facilitate more rapid acceptance of designs which meet a particular standard
-21 -
OUALITY CONTROL
· Facilitate quality control through th euse of standard designs of known quality and
specifications
* Diminish hazard of misunderstandings with suppliers
* Provide better control of the end product
· Reduce and simplify inspection
INVENTORIES
* Reduce capital requirements and amount of capital tied up in inventory
· Reduce record keeping
· Reduce storage area
· Reduce material handling
Reduce obsolescence and spoilage hazards
* Reduce stockkeeper's time requirements
* Reduce stockkeeper training required
· Facilitate more accurate and predictable planning and budgeting
· Provide quicker service
PRODUCTION
* Facilitate more routine activity and familiarity with fabrication and assembly
* Reduce re-work
* Facilitate mechanization
· Avoid production delays through stocked standard parts
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Emphasize on producibility in standard design accrues benefits with every application of
the standard without the need for further design
MAINTENANCE
* Reduce breakdowns and downtime
· Reduce preventative maintenance time
Reduce repair time
· Decrease critical expediting
· Reduce the number of unfamiliar jobs encountered
· Decrease the number of service-spares
· Reduce training time
The objective of this chapter is to place shipbuilding standardization in perspective in
order to facilitate a more detailed discussion of standardization of naval equipment and
components. It is hoped that the reader will gain an appreciation for the complexity of the
problems, processes and procedures involved. Achieving the goal of reduced construction
cycles and costs will require the use of many different standardization concepts
simultaneously, each serving as input for the other. Integrated Logistics Support costs and life
cycle costs are directly impacted by standardization and its resultant reduction in the logistics
requirements. It is hoped that this study will help to identify criteria which can be used to
prioritize and focus valuable attention and dollars in areas that have potential.
Just as standardization has a broad range of objectives, there is a broad range of
standardization. There are a wide variety of levels, or tiers, of standardization as well as
differing definitions and applications for standards such as:
Guidance, Requirements and Specifications
- 23 -
Benchmarks
Processes
Baseline Designs/Engineering
Interim and End-Products
Standards as Guidelines. Requirements and Secifications 6
Designers often refer to standard guidelines, requirements, and specifications in order
for a particular ship or ship's component to be "blessed" by the Navy or one of the many
classification societies or regulatory bodies. These types of standards do not constrain the
number or form of the items themselves, but offer a base set of standard requirements that the
items must live up to.
In 1933 the United States had 5000 standards in use nationally. Half of these were
government documents. At that time, four of 350 standard developing organizations were
solely devoted to standardization efforts.
These organizations included:
American Standards Association (Now ANSI)
American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM)
Central Committee on Lumber Standards
American Marine Standards Committee
Of these, only ANSI and ASTM survived the depression. By 1933 256 standards had
been developed for the maritime industry. These numbers have increased over the years.
6 The reader is referred to:
Toth, Robert; "Marine Industry Standards of the U.S. and the World"; Journal of Ship Production;
Vol. 2, No. 3; Aug 1986, pp. 179-184, for a more detailed discussion of the history of U.S. and
international standards.
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More than 81,000 standards exist nationally in the United States today. Of the 81,000 U.S.
standards, 9700 (12%) are related to the marine industry. This represents the largest number
of standards internationally (excepting the now defunct Soviet Union), although the growth
rate of U.S. standards is low in comparison to that of other nations. On first glance one may
believe that these Figures demonstrate that the U.S. is a world leader in standards development
and use. In reality, the Figures imply that the U.S. continues to circulate out of date standards
which are rarely updated when a better standard is developed and popularly used, thus leading
to a confusing variety of "standards". Another point of concern is that countries overseas
cooperate on the introduction of standards, while the U.S. continues to use unique standards
which are anything but "standard" on a global scale. Of the 9700 U.S. marine related
standards, the majority (7100) are promulgated by the government. The vast majority of these
are Navy standards and specifications. These types of standards do little to promote the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base.
In studying the decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base and its potential to
return to international competitiveness, it is important to keep in perspective the influence
which Navy requirements have had on the U.S. industry as a whole. In the absence of
commercial contracts, major U.S. shipbuilders have been catering to the Navy for the last
twenty years. In an effort to facilitate their interaction with, and ability to satisfy, the Navy and
its strict requirements, U.S. shipyards have evolved into organizations modeled in many
respects after their Navy customers. The U.S. shipyard is burdened with a high overhead
bureaucratic organization which has evolved over time in order to handle the vast quantities of
paperwork associated with the construction of a Navy ship. During this time U.S. shipyard
personnel have grown used to the stringent Navy requirements, and designers have grown
accustomed to meeting Navy requirements. U.S. designers and engineers are no longer
intimately familiar with true commercial design practices. Testing and inspection departments
have developed over time which are no longer familiar with inspection for sound shipbuilding
practices, but are instead familiar with inspecting for Navy requirements which are extremely
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conservative. These large organizations which are very familiar and comfortable with Navy
requirements but have little recent commercial experience are poorly prepared for commercial
shipbuilding.
Standard Processes 7
It is important to break production down into effectively managed tasks. In order to
standardize production processes it is useful to first group related tasks together. This is the
first step towards GROUP TECHNOLOGY, a methodology by which interim products are
classified according to the processes required to construct them. In order to discuss standard
tasks and standard products, the concept of modular/zone construction must first be
understood. This concept will be discussed further in relation to standard ship modules in
Chapter 8 of this thesis.
After identifying the processes utilized in the shipyard, it is important to group the parts
and products that require similar processes and manufacturing such that they are handled more
effectively. The evolution of group technology is discussed in more detail later in this thesis.
At the moment, consider that in order for this concept to work, adequate resources and
instructions must be set up in the planning stages. A natural complement to the group
technology approach is standardization within the production planning process.
Standardized production planning lends itself to modular/zone construction. A module
may be thought of as any structural assembly that will be directly erected onto the ship or hull
block. This module is built up from subassemblies, interim products and piece parts. A
simple analogy may be that this type of production is similar to LEGO® toy building blocks.
7 The reader is referred to:
Wade, Michael; "Use of Standard Task Blocks to Simplify the Ship Production Process"; Journal
of Ship Production; Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1986, pp. 101-109, for a detailed discussion of the task block
approach.
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The size of modules used to construct a ship will depend on the physical capability of a
particular yard and the logical divisions present in the ship design. Standard modules with
applications across ship types and multiple application within a single ship may also be
developed. These should be flexible modules which permit a variety of equipment to be
utilized as necessary, i.e. be able to adapt to changing technology. The design and use of the
modules should be such that they do not lock-in the function of the final product, the ship, but
do facilitate an efficient production plan once the ship's function and gross characteristics are
determined. The use of modular construction permits the workforce to perform the production
tasks necessary for a particular module earlier than would be possible using traditional
construction planning where the steel trades would typically finish their work before other
trades could gain access to the ship. These production processes may also be conducted within
closer proximity to the required shops and resources, cutting transit times and generally
improving the efficiency of the workforce. Using the modular approach, trades have greater
access to areas of the module they are working on, reducing the need to remove work already
completed to access a covered location. As the modules are completed they are erected onto the
ways or the hull. Because the modules are outfitted extensively prior to being erected onto the
hull, a greater percentage of the construction will be complete upon launch, which reduces
congestion problems during post-launch work and shortens overall time to delivery.
As modules are erected onto the ways, they lose their individual identity. As modules
come together, they form ZONES. Typically, a zone is a more obvious segregation of the
ship. It may be defined as an enclosed compartment, series of compartments, hull area or deck
area which has outfitting requirements that are distinct from those of neighboring zones.
Work packages that include parts lists, production drawings, production sketches and a
schedule are the basic ingredients for a standardized task block. Mr. Michael Wade of David
Taylor Research Center (DTRC) describes the standard task block as a node in a matrix defined
by a production stage axis and a type axis. Two similar matrices may be constructed in this
manner. A "standard modular breakdown" matrix may have one axis defined by fabrication,
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subassembly, construction, pre-outfit and erection while the other axis may be described by
deep tank, stem, bow, wing/side shell, deck, inner bottom, superstructure etc. This matrix
helps to define the module by location and processes involved in its construction. Similarly,
a "standard zone breakdown" matrix may be defined by one axis consisting of zone
fabrication, zone subassembly, zone preliminary outfit, zone final outfit and zone/system
testing and completion and another axis consisting of engine room machinery space, non-
engine room machinery space, storage/cargo space, tank/void space, steering gear space,
weather deck area, accommodations space, pilothouse space, and exterior hull area. Figure
2.0 illustrates the modular matrix.
L T C
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E
Figure 2.0 - Task Block Matrix
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Construction of the modules and zones is broken down into stages. The following definitions
for modular and zone construction stages appear in Mr. Wade's paper:
MODULAR STAGES:
FABRICATION:
SUBASSEMBLY:
CONSTRUCTION:
Numerically controlled and optical burning of plate; cutting
of structural shapes; cutting and forming of pipe and tube;
cutting cable to length; blasting and priming applicable
parts
Manufacture of 2-D panels with stiffeners such as decks
and bulkheads; small structural assemblies such as simple
foundations; coamings and stiffeners; piping, ventilation
and electrical subassemblies needed for the modular pre-
outfit stage; would include hot work items, pipe sleeves,
multiple transit frames, doors, hatches, studs, including
blasting and painting of these parts
3-D units incorporated into the modules; installation of all
outfitting hot-work planned to be performed at this time;
blasting and painting of the module
Final installation of all outfit items planned for installation
prior to erection (this is separated from "construction" by the
lack of hot-work in this stage to minimize damage to paint
and outfit work)
- 29 -
PRE-OUTFIT:
ERECTION: All activities related to actual structural erection of the
module upon the vessel or hull block; encompasses all
tasks that will occur during structural erection such as fitting
and installing stem tubes; pieces needed to tie the module
into ship structure would typically be included in the parts
list for this task, but not those for the module next in line;
also included are parts left off until erection such as fender
pipe.
ZONE STAGES:
FABRICATION:
SUBASSEMBLY:
PRE-OUTFIT:
FINAL OUTFIT:
Manufacture of all parts to support the zone assembly, sub-
assembly, pre-outfit, outfit and testing/completion
Manufacture of subassemblies and interim products
needed to support onboard outfitting of zones
Major piping runs, ventilation duct work, and hull insulation
installed/connected between modules; installation of major
machinery; incidental structural work; tank testing
Connections from equipment to piping, electrical and
ventilation systems; incidental painting and insulation;
underlayment and flooring; joiner work and sheathing;
stage continues until pipe testing is required
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COMPLETION: includes compartment pressure testing; finished insulation;
covering; miscellaneous installations, loading of spare parts
and outfit items; touch up and final painting; installation
of labels and plates; tank closing and inspection;
operational tests on systems in the zone (distinguished from
system wide testing)
The stages and types are differentiated by unique requirements common to that stage or
type. If the matrices are set up as described, then ship construction can be described by 35
modular task blocks and 45 zone task blocks for a total of 80 task blocks. More refined
matrices may be used to further describe the construction process in more detail. Once an
adequate set of matrices has been developed, work tasks common to the task blocks can be
identified. These work tasks can be identified by analyzing the structural systems and
components associated with each module and zone. Having defined the stages and basic tasks,
it is necessary to relate work tasks to one another. Some work tasks must be performed before
others can be started. These tasks can be referred to as being of the predecessor type.
Conversely, a successor type is one which requires other tasks to be performed prior to its
start. Ideally, one would like to explore manufacturing processes and materials in an effort to
maximize the possibility of tasks being performed simultaneously. One would like tasks to be
performed in parallel, thereby reducing total time to delivery. Once the production cycle has
been studied, and statistics developed and analyzed to characterize notional ship modules and
zones, estimates of the work content of typical modules and zones can be made. This
information can be utilized in conjunction with other criteria in identifying those areas which
could provide savings in acquisition cost, life cycle cost, module weight, or time to delivery.
The notional procedure to follow is to first identify the tasks associated with a
construction stage. Next the relationship between these tasks is determined. The work tasks
can then be sequenced into a standard task block. This process could be repeated until all such
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standard task blocks have been identified. Next the relationship between a zone or module
should be established. These serve as the basis for a rational and efficient construction plan.
A complete task sequence for a module or zone is built up from these standard task blocks.
The complete modules or zones can be related to one another by identifying tasks which will
interface standard task blocks of different zones or modules. Once the production sequence
has been established for the project, estimates of cost and time to delivery can be made. This
would be facilitated by accurate estimates of the work content of different types of tasks. By
describing modules and zones in terms of their work content as suggested, cost and time
estimates should be more accurate and more easily understood. Accurate means of predicting
the resources required for production processes is essential for an effective planning and
control function. These estimates can be considered benchmarks or production standards.
Standards as Benchmarks: Production Standards
Zone outfitting and Just in Time (JIT) production are dependent upon conformance to
production standards. The concept of a production standard is consistent with the principals of
Total Quality Management and Continuous Quality Improvement. An industry must have an
understanding of its processes and what the current performance expectations are.
Measurements should be taken to continuously improve these processes and insure that the
processes are held in control. Production standards are benchmarks useful in measurement,
control and improvement process.
SNAME/NSRP Panel SP-8 has published a hierarchy of such standards in the paper
"Production Oriented Planning: A Manual on Planning and Production Control for Shipyard
Use." In that document, a notional hierarchy of standards is discussed. The lowest level is the
most complicated. The next levels are less complicated and utilize information from the first.
Two approaches could be used to generate these standards. Aggregation could be used, in
which case higher standards are developed from lower ones. Disaggregation is the opposite
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process. Given one has a high level standard which has proven successful, it can be refined
and broken out into greater detail to develop lower level standards. Affinity diagrams can be
utilized to determine trends and relationships between tasks. The following hierarchy of
standards is suggested by SP-8:
Process standard
Production standard
Scheduling standard
Planning standard
Cost Estimating standard
An additional category which will be discussed might be:
Standards for accuracy (i.e. tolerances)
The standards differ depending upon their end use and the information available in their
development.
A typical production standard deals with the work content of a particular production job
which may have been defined as a standard process. An example may be the time expressed in
man-hours to fabricate a specific pipe spool detail in a fabrication. 8 Such a standard would be
based upon a number of process standards. A process standard describes a single work
process such as the time required to make a particular cut in a particular sized plate of a specific
size material. This type of benchmark can clearly be associated with a standard process as
discussed in the preceding section. It should be recalled that while a standard process refers to
a listing of all the procedures or instructions to perform a task, process standards refer to the
8 Graves, Robert; McGinnis, Leon; Robinson, Rodney; "Shipyard Production Standards"; Journal of
Ship Production; Vol. 4, No. 1; February 1988; pp. 65-69
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time required to perform elements of the work content outlined in the standard process. The
sum of all the process standards associated with a particular standard process would define a
production standard. A production standard would not include unmeasured work not covered
in the process standards. Interprocess and congestion delays are also excluded from these
standards. Those details would be included in scheduling standards.
The scheduling standard estimates the elapsed time in man-hours for specific
operations. These standards generally refer to the time required for larger assemblies rather
than a production standard, and may represent the sum of many production standards related to
all the processes and standard processes which are used to develop a small module for
example. This standard is used to plan manpower for shops and craft groups. These provide
the input for planning standards.
Planning standards are used to determine work package budgets. They are used in
developing key event schedules and milestones for the construction of major ship modules and
zones. Cost estimating standards are used to estimate ship construction costs based upon the
previous standards.
Of concern in shipyard construction is the accuracy to which components can be built.
Assuring that there are minimal variations in hull structure from project to project is important
for successful standardization. The Japanese Society of Naval Architects publishes a list of
indicators which pertain to hull variations. This publication lists, in terms of mean values and
standard deviations, the accuracy in structural details that are normally achieved by the
Japanese shipbuilding industry. The publication, the "Japanese Shipbuilding Quality Standard
(Hull Part)", is updated to reflect improvements and is used in contracts to establish
acceptability criteria.
Recent studies of naval ship construction using photogrammetric surveys indicate that
there are substantial variations which are illustrated in Table 2.0.9 This has had an impact on
9 Chirillo, Louis; "Flexible Standards: An Essential Innovation in Shipyards"; Journal of Ship
Production; Vol 7, No 1; Feb 1991, pp. 1-11
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repair work. A yard that has endeavored to construct replacement structure before the arrival of
the ship at the dock may find it necessary to do considerable rework in order to integrate the
structure with the ship properly.
Table 2.0 - FFG-7 Construction Survey, inches
Techniques to construct these standards have been developed by panel SP-8 of
SNAME/NSRP. Unfortunately, many shipyards do not have a firm enough grasp of their
processes to take this approach. These standards are the natural evolution of the measurement
and estimating systems already in place in most shipyards. An opportunity exists to study
these estimates further and to apply the aggregation and dissagregation techniques suggested
by the panel in an effort to establish a more streamlined approach to production planning.
These estimates must detail construction time and construction costs in terms of the work
content rather than empirical relationships to ship weight and volume, for example. Such an
approach would be part of a typical continuous quality improvement initiative which utilizes
statistical process control (SPC). SPC is a means of measuring performance against norms
which facilitates determining when a procedure has gone wrong. SPC also makes it easier to
measure the impact of changes to the production system. With a grasp of the processes and a
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Diff. from Design Dev. from Tolerance
YARDX YARDY YARDZ YARDX YARDY YARDZ
LOA -13.25 -6.25 -7.125 -8.75 -1.75 -2.625
LBP -3.125 -3.75 -0.125 accept. accept. accept.
BEAM,DK -1.500 -2.25 -0.500 -0.500 -1.375 accept.
BEAM,DWL -2.875 -4.25 -1.125 -1.875 -3.25 -0.125
DEPTH -1.125 +2.00 -1.125 -0.125 +1.00 -0.125
means to predict resource requirements, project management tools and optimization techniques
can be utilized more effectively and production streamlining can take place.
Standard Interim and End-products
Standardization can be implemented at every level of shipbuilding. The piece parts
making up ship equipment may be standard. The equipment itself may be standard. Structural
components may be standard. Ship modules or zones may be standard. One may also develop
families of standard ships.
Equipment standardization may refer to the development of a family of standard
designs to be used throughout the fleet; it may refer to limiting the variety of equipment
throughout the fleet, within a class or within a ship. It may also refer to standardizing
equipment dimensions and interfaces. Each of these varying levels of equipment
standardization has advantages and disadvantages. Developing standard families of equipment
reduces the logistics costs associated with a fleet which utilizes the standard family. This
savings comes at the expense of the equipment development costs, and costs associated with
the use of equipment which may not be performance or cost optimal for the application at hand.
Furthermore, this strict form of standardization is likely to result in some degree of "lock-in" to
a technology which may not be the state of the art. This type of standardization by definition
standardizes dimensions and interfaces, which has a dramatic impact upon design and the
production schedule. In the course of this research many shipyards were surveyed and they
unanimously cited the lack of timely delivery of critical Vendor Furnished Information (VFI) as
a source of problems. Standardization of critical characteristics allows the shipbuilder to know
what to design for, even if the vendor has not yet been selected. Minimizing the proliferation
of new equipment into the supply system for the operator of a large fleet, like the Navy, has
the effect of reducing Integrated Logistics Costs, but does not adequately impact the design or
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production schedule unless the critical VFI is made readily available to the contractors. In the
case of the Navy, the author found that a combination of minimizing needless proliferation of
new equipment into the supply system plus a concerted effort to standardize dimensions,
interfaces, and assemblies is a sensible course of action. Strict standardization on a particular
equipment design accross the entire fleet is best suited to those instances when performance,
reliability and maintainability are critical areas of historical concern (i.e. existing equipment is
not adequate and the Navy deems the only answer to be an in house design or a design
contracted to specifications). Standardization and flexibility or adaptability need not be
contradictory. This will be discussed further later.
Standardization of equipment provides savings in life cycle costs associated with the
equipment and may reduce the acquisition costs through economies of scale. This must be
traded off against the use of "over-rated" or "non-optimum" components. Standardizing
equipment has many benefits beyond costs directly and traditionally attributed to the
equipment. The use of modules and zone construction is greatly facilitated by up front
planning and design which requires detailed information regarding equipment dimensions,
weights, interfaces and constraints. Standardization of equipment is an important first step in
this direction.
The Japanese shipbuilding industry has used this approach to great advantage. Their
use of standards has been reported to greatly simplify their material procurement and
shipbuilding processes. The Japanese shipyards maintain files of vendor-catalog items that
have been pre-approved, which the Japanese yards refer to as their "standard equipment". For
a particular application, two or three vendors' equipment are listed in the file. Using special
agreements with the vendors, all the information is kept up to date. Savings from bulk orders
is achieved as is timely delivery. These "quality partnerships" are discussed later.
In addition to controlling the supply system, thereby insuring timely delivery of vendor
furnished information and the equipment itself, the Japanese shipbuilder and designer is not as
dependent upon VFI since equipment dimension standards are maintained across vendors. The
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Japanese government requires detailed standards to be utilized in Japanese industry. The
Japanese Marine Standards Association is responsible for preparation of Japanese marine
standards, which then go through a rigorous review by government industrial agencies, and
are then promulgated throughout the Japanese Shipbuilding industry. Representatives from
major marine industrial interests collaborate in the standard development. In the United States,
many groups exist with stated goals of promoting standardization, such as the NSRP panel
SP-6 which is devoted to shipbuilding standards. The societies which actually develop
standards do not always get input from industry representatives, and rarely is a standard
developed by industry consensus as it is in Japan. For a more detailed discussion of
commercial dimensional standards, the reader is referred to "Commercial Substitution as a
Means to Build the Industrial Shipbuilding Base", by Neil Gallagher (MIT Thesis, May 1993).
To date, the Navy has concentrated its standardization effort at reducing equipment life
cycle costs and improving maintenance records by standardizing on a reliable design and
increasing the depth of the supply system while decreasing its breadth. This maximizes the
likelihood of spares being available at any given time. Although these are important goals,
standardization has an impact upon the ship construction cycle which must be considered and
used in an advantageous manner by any forward thinking naval equipment standardization
policy. It was this positive impact upon the construction cycle which motivated Japan's
standardization program. Japan's program was driven by the builders and the vendors who
recognized it to be in their mutual interest to speed construction and delivery. Structural design
details and components can also be standardized and this standardization can often be linked to
equipment standardization efforts. In order for concurrent engineering (the parallel design and
determination of how the product is to be produced) to be successful and shrink the ship
production cycle, it is imperative that delivery of VFI be timely and that standard dimensions
and interfaces be sought.
The U.S. Navy has placed a great emphasis upon weight reduction as a means of
controlling costs. Weight reduction reduces fuel costs and allows flexibility with regard to
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weapons payload and growth potential for the future, but it is not clear that it leads to reduced
construction costs. This policy was largely the result of a lack of understanding of the
production processes involved. Although it is true that the costs of simple ship structure are
proportional to weight in many respects, this is not the case for more complicated structure.
Complex structure, such as equipment foundations, are typically only 10% of the ship's
weight but represent over 50% of the construction costs due to the intricacies of their
production. l ° An emphasis on weight reduction rather than producibility is a misdirected
approach since such a large percentage of the construction cost is actually directly attributable
to a very small percentage of the ship's displacement.
Construction costs are further increased by delays attributable to misunderstandings or
lack of proper information regarding the equipment to be mounted to foundations and the
constraints upon ship arrangements and production sequences. In order to weight optimize the
construction, engineers would often require structural shapes to be modified in the yard or
fabricated as entirely custom structural parts. Often, weight reduction efforts led to very
expensive back-up structure being required to meet shock requirements, since the primary
structure was not designed for these loads in an effort to reduce primary structure weight. This
leads to high costs and delayed delivery. Increased variety in the ship scantlings require the
shipyard to manage and store an increased variety of scantlings. The costs associated with
managing a complicated supply system can be tremendous. It requires extra storage space and
more complicated information systems as well as more personnel. The variety also increases
the frequency of construction errors, such as light angles being used where heavy angles were
required. These errors are often caught late in the construction cycle during inspection periods
and require expensive re-work. Furthermore, the lighter structural shapes are often much more
expensive since they do not benefit from economies of scale and are often custom built to
weight optimize the design.
10 Presentation by John Hopkinson of Vibtech, inc. to NSRP Panel SP-6 on standardization of
foundations
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Once again a trade off exists, in this case between a weight optimized design and a
design which minimizes the variety of structural shapes. By providing designers and engineers
with lists of available standard structural components along with all the information necessary
to do the design work, including the costs of structural components, cost trade-offs could be
utilized as one of the design parameters. Just as designers traditionally would be provided
with dimensions and weight information to allow them to study weight optimization, costs
could be considered easily as well. "Standardization of Ship Structural Design" by George A.
Kriezas offers a comparison between cost optimized and weight optimized designs. A study of
the design of a Large Crude Carrier indicated that a savings of $8614 could be achieved per
meter of midship section while only $2555 would be lost in carrying capacity per meter (at 10
$/ton calculated in present value terms over an estimated ship life). When one considers that
this comparison only accounted for the costs of acquiring steel structural shapes and did not
incorporate re-work expenses, storage costs, time to delivery and management costs, it is
evident that much is to be gained by standardizing ship structure. Even more incentive exists
for naval combatants. Commercial ship structure is not as complicated since less equipment is
installed and it need not stand up to rigorous shock requirements. The cost savings associated
with naval ships which have more structure, equipment and complicated foundations to be
standardized would be considerably higher. Vibtech, Inc. of Rhode Island has expertise in this
area, and has found that 20% savings in foundation construction costs can be achieved by
emphasizing producibility in the design and minimizing the needless introduction of extra
structural components. The time required to construct these foundations is also reduced.
By standardizing equipment dimensions and attachments, more detailed foundation
design could be conducted up front, with producibility and commonality as the driving
considerations which would result in even greater savings. There have been several recent
projects involving the re-design of naval foundations to reduce costs in follow-ships after it
was discovered that lead ship construction costs were considerable. Had the appropriate care
been taken early in the design process, these re-engineering costs could have been avoided.
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Vibtech provided the author with information regarding these projects. Among the ship
classes studied were a Canadian Patrol Frigate, DDG-51, CG-47, FFG-7 and the AOE-10.
Foundations can be classified according to their attachment location, means of attachment and
shape. For example, foundations can be mounted to bulkheads either on stiffeners or plate; to
decks from above (on the plate) or below (hung from stiffeners); to the side shell or side shell
structure; to the inner bottom; or platforms levels and tank-tops. These locations are important
as they define the forces which the structure must withstand according to Navy Shock Criteria
(DDS-072, MILSTD-907D). The foundation shapes may be broken down into several types.
Some of these types include:
* Grillage
Frame
Truss
Rack/Panel
Cantilever/Shelf
Figure 2.1 illustrates these types of foundations. Given that most foundations may be
classified in this way, and that equipment serving the same purpose will generally be definable
within a certain range for weight, geometry and size and have the same or similar requirements
for foundation stiffness and location in space, it may be possible to utilize standard foundations
for many applications. Vibtech has compiled a database of foundation geometry for the ships
which it has worked on. Figure 2.2 illustrates the point that for a given foundation type, the
encountered geometries are not limitless. The foundation designs are defined within bounds
because they are driven by the same requirements and equipment characteristics do not vary
wildly for a given application. Equipment characteristics vary just enough to require
foundations developed through traditional means to be engineered for each application.
Equipment statistics can be utilized to bound the design problem prior to foundation design.
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Figure 2.3 illustrates some of the elements of such a study. Using these equipment statistics,
parametric studies can be performed to show that foundations of a certain type have particular
limits of applicability.
Progress is being made in this area as the Navy and shipyards are forced to study the
problems of foundation design as a means to reduce costs by developing more producible
designs. The lack of dimensional and interface standards in the United States complicates
foundation design and production. By limiting the variety of equipment which can be
introduced in a contract, progressive foundation and detail design work should be able to
continue if designs are developed which are flexible and can accept the pre-qualified equipment
by accounting for the possible envelope dimensions and bolting patterns. Dimensional control
is a powerful approach which has aided foreign shipbuilders and limits the success of U.S.
shipyards. In practice it was found that the attention paid to foundation design not only saved
production costs but also resulted in reduced weight since the producible designs often
eliminated welds and back-up structure which was proven unnecessary through detailed
structural analysis. This approach can be extended to the development of common modules
based upon the same statistics and principals.
- 42 -
T1ICz
ra .
i l t 
T'T'f u
T,( 
Tirt U
.!Aii ZS t
- -14-
I.~~~~~~~~
Ir n m ga r Vout
Figure 2.1 - Foundation Characterizationl1
11 Reprinted by permission of VIBTECH, INC.
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CHAPTER 3: PROGRESS WITHIN THE NAVY
In this chapter the progress of the Navy towards standardization goals will be
discussed. Several important distinctions should be made with regard to standardization of
naval equipment. Standardization can take several forms, differentiated by timing and scope.
Standardization can be both Pre-active and Reactive. Pre-active standardization efforts take
place prior or parallel to the initial ship design. Often, it is necessary to standardize after
significant design activity has taken place, or even after construction has been started as a
means of controlling costs. This would be an example of reactive standardization.
Standardization scope refers to the degree of standardization. A standard design may be
developed, requiring a specific equipment design to be installed. The variety of equipment
installed may be required to be reduced, with maximum utilization of equipment already in the
Navy supply system. Generally, equipment standardization can take the following forms
which are illustrated in Figure 3.0:
* Standardization across the fleet
* Standardization across ships within a class
· Standardization within a ship
- 46 -
STNDR (PR-QUA IIE EQUIPMENT~ -
INTRASHIP
Multiple applications within a ship
CLASS STANDARDIZATION
Standardize across an entire class
FLEET STANDARDIZATION
Standardize across the entire fleet
Figure 3.0 - Naval Equipment Standardization
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Fleet standardization can have significant advantages with regard to savings in logistics
costs. By utilizing the same equipment across the fleet, the demands on the logistics
organization are decreased and the availability of spares should increase with the decreased
requirement to supply a wider variety of equipment support. Fleet standardization can take two
forms. One can actually endeavor to decrease the number of items of supply by developing
standard designs, which has the greatest advantages with regard to logistics costs. Another
option is to minimize the introduction of new items of supply. Minimizing the number of new
items of supply keeps increasing logistics costs in check without the necessity of developing a
standard design, or the problems of locking into a design which may prove to be obsolete.
The arguments for fleet standardization are generally a result of a desire for reducing
logistics costs or locking into a reliable design. Fleet standardization would have an impact
upon construction costs if the standardized item was one which was used frequently across all
ship types. Reduced construction costs are dependent upon a standardized mounting method,
standardized interfaces and on timely delivery of both the equipment and vendor furnished
information. Fleet standardization could provide all these things, but at a high cost which must
be weighed against the attributable savings in other areas.
Fleet standardization requires the government to either develop an equipment itself,
creating all drawings and engineering itself, or buy all necessary information from a vendor.
This would not be the case if the Navy were to simply sign a sole-source contract with a
vendor. This is not done for a number of reasons. First of all, it is viewed as an impediment
to competition. Secondly, competition is viewed as necessary to keep costs in check since the
Navy does not have confidence that vendors would continue to supply equipment at low costs
once competition has been eliminated. Eliminating competition could eliminate companies,
which has political and legal ramifications. One approach may be to form "quality
partnerships" based upon option contracts. These will be discussed in more detail later.
Developing equipment "from scratch" as a fleet standard is expensive, as is purchasing the
-48 -
information. Once a standard item has been developed, it is then put up for competitive bid by
vendors, who build the item to the developed specifications. Equipment manufactured this
way is always considerably more expensive than equipment which has been developed by a
vendor and then adapted to use by the Navy. This result is counter to the philosophy that by
maximizing the number of applications of an equipment, the price should go down as a
function of economies of scale. One such development is the family of standard titanium fire
pumps.1 4 During the course of this research, the resounding opinion in government and
industry was that while economies of scale reduce the cost for items which are adaptations of
commercially viable products, this would not be true for military items since Navy volumes
alone are not adequate to justify the expense involved. Navy volumes combined with
commercial sales of the same or similar product tend to reduce costs.
The consensus among experts interviewed in the Navy, industry and standards
associations is that the appropriate steps to take are to minimize the introduction of new items
of supply to those times which truly warrant it. The difficulty is in deciding when this is the
case. The Navy has taken steps in this direction by requiring contractors to give priority to
current items of supply in selecting equipment. Unfortunately, the contractual language
regarding this preference for current items of supply is weak. The contractual language does
not, in the case of a lead ship, demand preference be given to equipment already in the supply
system. Instead it suggests it or states that contractors "are encouraged to...". Contractors are
the first to admit that without stronger language, they will utilize equipment which they can get
a "good deal" on. This is a result of the shipbuilder's perception that the Navy is more
interested in low acquisition costs than a contractor's adherence to a weakly worded portion of
an RFP. Many of the people interviewed had stories of contracts in which the Navy spoke
highly of standardization goals early on, only to eventually base a decision solely on
14 For a detailed discussion of the standard titanium fire pumps, the reader is referred to:
Marcus, H.S., Zografakis, N., Tedesco, M.P.;Building Upon the Successes of Standardization Within
the U.S. Navy; NSRP Ship Production Symposium, 1992
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acquisition prices as a result of political pressure. Some industry personel indicated that even
when an RFP mentioned a financial incentive was being considered for meeting standardization
goals, these incentives sometimes disappeared once the details of the contract were revealed.
For these reasons, contractors go after a "good deal" rather than a supported item, unless
explicitly required to do otherwise. This good deal may be in reference to better price,
preferential treatment for other equipment deals, or better supply arrangements.
Class standardization refers to an effort taken to insure that follow ships utilize
equipment which has been installed in the lead ship. The Navy has taken definite steps in this
direction with stronger language than that for lead ships regarding the use of class standard
equipment. The Navy requires as part of a CDRL (Contract Deliverables Requirements List)
that contractors provide a standardization program plan for follow ships. This program plan
must demonstrate that the shipyard has some organization in place to handle the standardization
and integrated logistics support engineering functions which assigns responsibility for key
decisions. Generally, the contractual language requires contractors to procure equipment in the
following order of preference:
Class Standard First
Supported equipment if possible when class standard is not acquired
Other equipment
Contractors are required to provide an economic evaluation and justification with a
waiver request when an equipment other than a class standard item is used. Class
standardization could be very powerful in that it maximizes construction cost savings from
lessons learned, and could provide savings from economies of scale if approached correctly.
Unfortunately, class standardization is not always utilized to full advantage today.
Class standardization was achieved by Total Package Procurement (TPP), which was
the established policy prior to 1971. TPP required that the bidding shipyards be responsible
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for providing a design which met a performance specification. The bid price was to include
design and engineering costs, construction costs for all the foreseen ships in the class, ILS
costs and outfitting costs. Although this approach generally resulted in savings in construction
costs from lessons learned, series ship construction, and established relationships with
vendors, the Navy was unhappy with this acquisition practice. This dissatisfaction was a
result of performance rather than cost considerations. The economic climate in the Navy was
significantly different than it is today, and it was believed that the Navy could get a superior
product if it adopted a "fly before you buy" approach to follow ships, acquiring the lead ship
or ships first. The lead ships would be tested extensively, and lessons learned or new
requirements used in follow ships. The decision could also be made to completely revise or
abandon the design. Reacting in 1971, the policy was changed and only current fiscal year
ships were to be acquired in a contract. This meant that a lead ship yard was no longer
guaranteed follow ship work. A further result was that the Naval Sea Systems Command took
control over the design, with the shipyards offering assistance. This tended to result in
designs which neglected producibility considerations, since NAVSEA did not have adequate
experience and contact with the shipyards. These contracts were competitively negotiated fixed
price contracts.
In 1973, the Navy utilized a Cost Plus Incentive Fee structure for the lead ship FFG-7
frigate in an effort to reduce costs of follow ships through careful "design to cost" engineering
and purchase plans. The Navy approached class standardization relatively successfully in its
acquisition policies and procedures for the FFG-7 class frigates. This ship was the first ship to
be "designed to cost" under a cost constraint. Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) for
the combat systems in the lead ship was procured and delivered to the lead yard, Bath Iron
Works (BIW), according to a contractually established schedule. For follow ships, the GFE
inspecting, testing, and delivery was handled by third party "grooming sites" such as Sperry
Systems Management Division. In addition to three GFE combat systems/communications
systems, 42 other major equipment were identified by the Navy to be CLASS STANDARD.
- 51 -
The Navy only called out the equipment type and specs, the task of selecting vendors was
relegated to BIW as the lead yard. Acquisition cost was the driving factor behind BIW's
choice of vendors. The price BIW was required to use as its criteria was the total price for the
lead ship plus 30 additional shipsets to be delivered according to a possible range of pre-
established delivery rates to accommodate likely follow-on schedules. The fixed-price options
for the equipment for the 30 follow ships were to be excersisable by the follow yards, by the
government or by BIW as the government's agent. Three of the 42 non-combat items were
identified to be supplied as GFE to follow yards by BIW as the government's agent. These
items included Gas Turbines, diesel-generator sets and main reduction gear. These items were
singled out to ensure adequate delivery schedules which could minimize the critical path for
construction.
Class standardization of major equipment types naturally leads to standardization of
Class Working Drawings. These drawings included component foundations, installations and
ship arrangements. A system was created that was intended to motivate but not mandate follow
ships be built to lead ship drawings. The FFG-7 class finally included 51 ships, constructed
at three shipyards with a high rate of class standardization. This high degree of class
standardization came as a result of economic incentives to follow yards in the form of a low
negotiated option price on equipment for contractor furnished equipment. Some items were
required to be utilized and were delivered as GFE.
The FFG-7 program's class standardization requirements assured savings with regard
to delivery times and equipment acquisition costs through the use of option purchase plans
with vendors. Such an approach is often referred to today as a "quality partnership" with a
vendor. 15 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the multitude of contracting
options for quality partnerships, it is important to understand this concept which could provide
15 The reader is referred to:
Dickenson, T.E.; Contractual Aspects for Standardization of HM&E Equipment in Naval Ship
Acquisitions; MIT Thesis; May 1993
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major benefits for the Navy if approached correctly. The first major roadblock to vendor
partnering is the perception that regulations forbid it.
Many vendors and contractors cite the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (which
came into being long after the FFG-7 acquisition) and the Federal Acquisition Regulations as
barriers which prevents true quality partnership and class standardization. The 1984 act, and
the definition of competition, has been a point of confusion. It is often unclear whether
competition requires bids to be received for every discrete acquisition on a fiscal year basis,
implying that each time a major delivery is requested that item be competed, or that competition
may be assumed to be required at the beginning of a process towards a quality partnership for a
particular class of ships. A vendor, dissatisfied with the results of such a contract is likely to
sue, claiming a sole source contract in contradiction of the Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Vendors and contractors have the impression that long term partnership contracts are not legal.
Although this view is often taken, there are a number of places in the FAR which imply that
quality partnerships are legal, given competition exists at the outset of the process and a
mechanism is in place to adjust the process at some point if it is believed the vendor is not
acting fairly. Certainly the interpretation that the 1984 act and the FAR forbid partnerships is
contrary to the language and spirit of standardization statutes, such as the Standardization Act
of 1952.
As was mentioned, there a variety of contractual mechanisms which can be put in
place. Although Congress recognizes a need to improve the acquisition process, they are not
eager to adopt a system which limits their ability to kill a project which they believe is wasteful,
doesn't perform, or no longer meets the needs of the Navy. The author believes that an
acquisition policy could be put in place which would provide this flexibility and still maximize
benefits.
Another type of standardization is intra-ship standardization. This refers to an effort to
minimize the variety of equipment and components installed within a ship. This effort has
three major benefits. First, it provides the greatest construction benefits by maximizing the
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possibility for common mountings and production processes. This type of standardization
minimizes the chances of utilizing the wrong component and subsequent re-work. Secondly, it
simplifies the support requirements for the ship and increases availability by increasing the
odds that a spare part will be available since less variety needs to be supported. Thirdly, it
maximizes crew performance by minimizing the variety of equipment and procedures the crew
must be familiar with. The Navy has made a recent effort to standardize the valves aboard the
DDG-51 class.
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Information Systems
In order to maximize the benefits attributable to standardization, standardization efforts
must be involved as early as possible in the design process. This requires that standardization
be a guiding principal in the design phase and all other phases of acquisition and Navy R&D.
For this to be a reality, designers and engineers must have access to the widest variety of
information regarding the equipment in the Navy supply system. Both performance and
physical characteristics must be supplied in order to facilitate decisions. Ideally a
comprehensive database would serve this purpose. The Naval Sea Logistics Center maintains
data useful for standardization and ship design.
Hull. Mechanical and Electrical Data Research System
A database has been available since October 1990 for general use and has been
distributed by the Naval Sea Logistics Center. This database, the Hull, Mechanical and
Electrical Equipment Data Research System (HEDRS) is a significant step in the right
direction. In the past the Navy relied upon performance specifications and standards for
equipment. These specifications and standards did not identify existing equipment and as a
result new and differing equipment was introduced at great logistics expense. The cataloging
function which a database such as HEDRS performs serves to define the "universe of
supported equipment" while the standardization function works to compress this universe.
The HEDRS database is a personal computer Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD-ROM)
based system which is available at no cost to those involved with Navy acquisition, including
designers. The system is intended to provide application, identification, physical and
performance characteristics, availability of logistics documentation, points of contact with
specialists, and reprocurability information on all HM&E equipment currently installed in the
Active and Active Reserve fleet. HEDRS consists of four principal segments:
- 55 -
Component Characteristics File (CCF): Describes equipment installed in the fleet by
form, fit, function and some applicable Milspec information. The CCF tracks
equipment by its Allowance Parts List number. The APL number is used by
NAVSEALOGCEN to identify the parts making up an equipment's ILS package. APL
numbers generally (but not always) define unique items of supply. Sometimes two
items with different APL numbers may in fact be the same item with only a minor
change which was entered into the system as a separate item through error, oversight or
loopholes in the procedures. This duplicity generally increases ILS costs and
complicates the standardization process. CCF data is obtained from the Navy's Ship
Parts Control Center (SPCC).
Equipment Applications File: Identifies ships on which equipment is installed and
tracks the number of installations per ship, class or in the fleet. Information tracked
includes installation location by the Service Application Code (SAC), Expanded Ship
Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS) and Ship Work Authorization Boundary
(SWAB). The equipment applications file is very useful for generating equipment lists
for particular ships or classes. It also allows the user to obtain information about an
equipment type which satisfies certain performance characteristics and is, for example,
installed in more than a particular number of ships.
Supportability: Each APL is assigned an Engineering Support Code (ESC) which
defines the level of availability of equipment support. The ESC is determined during a
survey of manufacturers which is updated every few years.
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Integrated Logistics Support: The ILS database tracks the existence of ILS data for a
particular equipment and provides information regarding whether the ILS data is
possessed by the Navy.
NAVSEALOGCEN has divided equipment into 99 equipment categories. Table 3.0
lists the different equipment categories. Within each equipment category are subcategories
identified by numbers relating the category to a Lead Allowance Parts List number (LAPL).
Within each LAPL are a number of APL's.
EC DESCRIPTON
01 pumps
02 boilers
03 heat exchangers
04 condensers
05 turbines
06 compressors
07 heaters
08 distilling plants
09 battery chargers
10 meters
11 converters
12 maintenance & repair eq.
13 transformers
14 circuit breakers
15 controllers
16 generators
17 motors
18 motor generators
19 relays
20 rheostats
21 switches
22 switchboards
23 visual alarms
24 lighting fixtures
25 gyro compass
26 projection eq.
27 interior comm.
28 navigational
29 injectors
30 burners
31 marine hardware
32 refrigeration
EC DESCRIPTION
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
air conditioning
starters
wipers
audible alarms
bearings
indicators
clutches
fans
shop eq.
regulators
galley eq.
dehumidification
gages
testing and measuring
chemical warfare
filters
carburetors
panels
isolaters
hydraulic eq.
capstans
reels/towing eq.
davits
cranes
hoists
elevators
steering gear
control eq.
winches
windlasses
Fire Fighting
lubricators
EC DESCRIPTION
66 engines
67 plumbing
68 magnetos
69 gears
70 governors
71 ignition eq.
72 small boats
73 ejectors
74 eductors
75 strainers
76 purifiers
77 traps
78 couplings
79 silencing eq.
80 brakes
81 blowers
82 welding
83 ship/boat propulsion
85 deck machinery
86 photographic eq.
87 underwater log eq.
88 valves
89 misc. parts
91 laundry
92 tanks
93 pipe, tubing, fittings
94 ASW/minesweeping
95 automotive
97 periscopes/masts
98 special power plant
99 misc. equipment
Table 3.0 - Equipment Categories
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A drawback to the HEDRS system is that critical manufacturer's data often needed to
fully describe the equipment in a meaningful way has often been inadvertently omitted or
withheld by the manufacturer. This severely limits the utility of the system as a design aid. A
further drawback to the HEDRS system is that it is difficult to access the information necessary
to perform standardization activities. The reason that the information is difficult to apply to
standardization activities is that HEDRS was not intended for this purpose when it was
introduced.
The HEDRS system was initially intended to be used as a reference for equipment
which satisfies a tight envelope of performance requirements. It was not intended to be used to
perform the broad reviews necessary for standardization activities. Functions which must be
made available to designers and engineers if standardization efforts are to succeed include:
Detailed vendor furnished information: The construction cycle is severely hampered by
delays in obtaining VFI. Providing this information in a database would speed the
process. The ability to obtain statistics regarding weight and envelope dimensions for
all equipment types on a large scale should be incorporated into HEDRS. This
information could then be used to statistically bound the engineering problem, allowing
the designer to develop structural systems and interfaces which may be used for a
variety of equipment. At this time HEDRS has a limited amount of this information for
some of the equipment which is in the database. Access to the data is not efficient.
This should and may be improved in future releases of the database.
Even with these drawbacks, the HEDRS system has proven to be a very useful tool
which should be given more attention. It has been used extensively in this study to identify
and prioritize equipment which may have standardization potential. With HEDRS, the Navy
must take the responsibility of cooperating with designers in equipment selection decisions.
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This requires direction and monitoring. This direction and monitoring may come as a result of
the requirement for standardization deviation reviews and the use of a database management
system like HEDRS. Since its introduction, an improved version of HEDRS has been
introduced from time to time. NAVSEALOGCEN will soon introduce a version which should
provide significant benefits in that it allows easier access to more detailed VFI. In future
development of the system, it is imperative that it be made very easy to use if the Navy is to
require it to be utilized as part of a contract. The Navy will need to provide training materials
and support for the system. Beyond this, NAVSEALOGCEN must be prepared to conduct
equipment surveys in a timely fashion at the contractor's request if the contractor has difficulty
with, or is unable to utilize, HEDRS. NAVSEALOGCEN appears receptive to these
suggestions.
Ships' 3-M Reference CD
The Naval Sea Logistics Center has historically maintained a database of maintenance
and reference information for the ships in the fleet. NAVSEALOGCEN has recently
developed a Compact Disc of Ship's Reference Information. It contains information about
Navy equipment and ships such as ship steaming hours and equipment population data (i.e.
number of ships installed on and number of total installations). Among the options and cross
references available in this database are:
Ship Information/Steaming Hours:
This option accesses the Activity/Steaming Hours File, or ASF. The ASF contains the
steaming hours underway and not underway for the activity. Steaming Hours Underway
refers to the number of hours that the engineering department is "ready to answer all bells".
Steaming Hours Not Underway is the number of hours the ship is anchored and the main
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engines are secured. The database also lists commission and delivery dates, overhaul dates
and fuel use data.
Service Application Code:
This option is used to group equipment, components and assemblies according to
system or service applications aboard a ship. This option has the potential to be useful for
common module design. Once equipment which has potential for standardization has been
targeted, the SAC search can be used to identify other equipment associated with the targeted
equipment.
Equipment ID Code:
The EIC is a four to seven digit alphanumeric code which identifies the system, sub-
system and equipment.
Allowance Parts List:
An APL number is an eight digit number which identifies the parts list of an equipment
or component.
Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure:
ESWBS is a numerical code which defines uniform system boundaries for use
throughout the industrial process and the preventive maintenance system (PMS).
The 3-M database and HEDRS are tools which can serve as a basis for standardization
decisions. These systems should be expanded to meet their potential as powerful design and
acquisition tools.
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Cost Analysis Models
Integrated Logistics Support Costs
The Naval Sea Logistics Center developed a cost algorithm which is to be used as a
trade-off tool for evaluating the merit of introducing a new item into the naval supply system.
Evaluation of impact upon life cycle costs is an important part of the standardization puzzle.
Many organizations, both in government and industry in many fields, have wrestled with the
question of evaluating logistics and life cycle costs. The Naval Sea Logistics Center model,
along with others, is reviewed in detail in Chapter 4.
Data Ownership Analysis Model 16
The Data Ownership Analysis model attempts to quantify how much the
government should be willing to pay for manufacturing data rights and Level III drawings for
reprocurement action. Data rights and Level III drawings are the detailed information required
in order to allow any manufacturer to build an equipment to specification for the Navy. This
information would need to be bought or developed any time the Navy wanted to settle on a
fleet-wide standard equipment which it did not want to sole source to a vendor. Since the
beginning of the "Breakout" and the "Buy Our Spares Smart" (BOSS) programs in 1983, the
16 The reader is referred to:
Johnson, CDR. M.S., Klingel, LCDR, M.J.; Management Consulting Report for Commanding
Officer NAVSEALOGCEN. October 1989
andr
Marcus, H.S., Zografakis, N., Tedesco, M.P.; Building on The Successes of Standardization in The
Navy; NSRP Ship Production Symposium, 1992
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Navy has steadily concerned itself with getting the data rights from the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM). However, securing data rights may not always be worthwhile. Vendors
justifiably view data rights as "proprietary". Accordingly, vendors require reimbursement or
financial incentive to relinquish this information. This NAVSEALOGCEN model attempts to
quantify how much the government should be willing to spend. NAVSEALOGCEN freely
admits that the model is in need of considerable work and could never replace a decision
maker's sound judgment. The model tries to develop an analytical approach for the economic
analysis necessary to objectively evaluate the cost/value to the Navy for the procurement of
manufacturing data and rights in data for parts, components and equipment. The model is
constructed such that it evaluates the trade-off between the value of Data (DV) and the Potential
Savings (PS) associated with acquiring data rights for parts. When evaluating equipment, the
model is repeated for each part making up the equipment. The workings of the model will not
be discussed in detail here. The reader is referred to one of the referenced documents from
footnote 17 for a detailed explanation of this model.
The Data Ownership Analysis Model has not been used extensively. It should be
stressed that the decision of whether or not to purchase data rights need not be coupled with the
decision of whether or not to standardize. Data rights are not a necessity for efforts to
minimize the introduction of new items of supply, or for class standardization efforts which
seek to set up purchase options and quality partnerships with vendors.
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Standardization Candidate Selection Criteria Model17
The objective of the Standardization Candidate Selection Criteria Model (SCSC) is
to enable NAVSEALOGCEN to more effectively perform an economic analysis on a group of
equipment (identified by APL numbers) to determine whether or not it would be worthwhile to
standardize that equipment. The model is intended to provide a framework for prioritizing
functionally similar equipment types that show the greatest potential for standardization
savings. The model is divided into three principal phases.
PHASE I: EQUIPMENT NOMINATION
In Phase I, a list of APL's is created which corresponds to a nominated equipment
or equipment type. Application and equipment data which is necessary to perform the analysis
is collected during this phase. During this phase the base of manufacturers for the equipment is
studied. This is important to the Navy because it is an important factor in maintainability and
reliability. The population of the equipment is studied to determine if it is a frequently utilized
equipment type and if there are many APL's satisfying similar performance requirements with
few applications per APL. These concepts are discussed in more detail later in this thesis along
with a discussion of other criteria identified in the course of this study which are not utilized in
the SCSC model. Phase I is principally concerned with population data. In Phase II, costs
will be considered. Figure 3.1 illustrates the steps in Phase I.
17 For a detailed description of the NAVSEALOGCEN model:
NAVSEALOGCEN; Standardization Candidate Criteria Users Guide
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TYPICAL NOMINATING CONSIDERATIONS
Figure 3.1 - SCSC PHASE 118
18 Adapted from: NAVSEALOGCEN; Standardization Candidate Criteria Users Guide
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PHASE II: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS PREPARATION
In Phase II, data regarding Integrated Logistics Costs and maintenance costs are
collected. In this phase, an average annual repair cost is determined. An economic analysis is
performed to determine the economic potential for standardization. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
notional process flow for phase II.
PHASE III: DESIGN SELECTION
In phase III, the availability of engineering data rights is explored for equipment which
has been identified as being economically feasible for standardization. Figure 3.3 illustrates
this process.
The SCSC model serves as an excellent starting point and as a framework. Before
standardization can be successful and fulfill its potential as a means to help bring rising
acquisition costs into check, a system such as SCSC must incorporate more considerations
than logistics costs and reliability concerns. This thesis explores other considerations which
should be incorporated into systems like NAVSEA's SCSC.
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Figure 3.2 - SCSC Phase II19
19 ~ Adapted from: NAVSEALOGCEN; Standardization Candidate Criteria Users Guide
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Figure 3.3 - SCSC PHASE III20
Adapted from: NAVSEALOGCEN; Standardization Candidate Criteria Users Guide
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Ouantifving the Navy's Progress
In order to improve any process, it is first necessary to measure the current level of
performance. In the case of naval equipment standardization, one quantifiable measure of the
Navy's success in controlling the proliferation of new equipment into the supply system is the
number of new APL's introduced each year. The Naval Sea Logistics Center tracks APL
proliferation each year as a means of measuring the impact of its programs. A reduction in the
number of APL's introduced each year for a particular equipment category would have an
associated reduction in integrated logistics support costs. Each year NAVSEALOGCEN
produces Standard Profiles Reports which provide these statistics.
A review of the statistics indicates that many of the same equipment categories which
were the largest contributors to the proliferation problem in 1979 were still contributors in
1989. Table 3.1 illustrates this for seven equipment categories.
Table 3.1 - Proliferation Contributors
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APL PROLIFERATION
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION FY79 FY89
01 PUMPS 211 214
15 CONTROLLERS 225 260
17 MOTORS 331 351
21 SWITCHES 181 100
32 REFRIGERATION 176 134
61 CONTROL EQUIP. 328 293
88 VALVES 1991 821
In 1979 these seven equipment categories were responsible for 47% of total new APL
introductions, while in 1989 they were responsible for 53%. Although total proliferation fell
from 7370 new APL's in 1979 to 4114 in 1989, this drop must be taken in the context of the
reduced level of ship construction and overhaul. It is this factor, the actual number of
equipment installations each year, which must be taken into account to truly represent
successful progress towards inhibiting APL proliferation. Furthermore, it makes little sense to
concentrate effort on those equipment categories which proliferate due to rapid technological
turnover (obsolescence) rather than through mismanagement of the acquisition function.
A review of all of the statistics for 1992 reveals the top twenty proliferation
"offenders". These twenty equipment categories have historically been more significant than
the others. Table 3.2 lists these twenty categories.
88 - Valves
17 - Motors
07 - Heaters
50- Panels
61 - Control Equipment
01 - Pumps
52 - Hydraulic Equipment
15 - Controllers
21 - Switches
43 - Galley Equipment
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
31 -
38-
32 -
27 -
72-
48 -
64-
95 -
41 -
75 -
Hardware and Hull Items
Indicators
Refrigeration Equipment
Interior Communication Equipment
Landing Craft/Small Boats
Filters
Fire Fighting Equipment
Automotive & Construction
Shop Equipment
Strainers
Table 3.2 - High Proliferation Equipment Categories
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01)
02)
03)
04)
05)
06)
07)
08)
09)
10)
Figure 3.4 illustrates the total APL proliferation on a yearly basis, 1977 to 1992. The
Figure shows that proliferation began to increase dramatically in the early 1980's, along with
the naval construction boom. In 1986, proliferation began to decrease as naval construction
waned and emphasis turned to less complicated low-mix ships.
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Figure 3.4 - Proliferation Trend2 l
21 Figure supplied by NAVSEALOGCEN
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the naval construction trend data which is supplied by NAVSEA.
While proliferation has begun to decrease, so has the level of ship construction and the
complexity of the ships being built (low mix verse advanced combatants and submarines).
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Figure 3.5 - Naval Construction2 2
Figure supplied by NAVSEA
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The HEDRS database which was discussed earlier has potential as a design tool and a
tool for standardization. It is currently intended to be provided to contractors in support of the
policy of preference for equipment found to be supported in the fleet. It should be noted that
other private companies offer databases which provide equipment information. One such
system is the ILS electronic market offered by the Inventory Locator Service, Inc. (a division
of the Ryder System Company). This system is best known for providing information
regarding the availability of a particular equipment and can pin-point sellers who have the
equipment to sell immediately. The system is currently set up to track national stock numbers,
but can also track APL numbers. The systems capabilities complements HEDRS since
HEDRS gives points of contact for manufacturers but little information regarding immediate
availability of a component.
In order for the HEDRS effort to be successful, it is necessary for the information
included in the database to be as complete as possible. A review of NAVSEALOGCEN
statistics reveals that on average, 45% of the data is entered. Of the possible envelope
dimension entries, 5.6% are complete on average. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate the current
level of completeness of the database with regard to total information and envelope
dimensions. As can be seen, and is already recognized by NAVSEALOGCEN, considerable
work is needed to provide a more complete system. NAVSEALOGCEN is working towards
this goal.
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Figure 3.6 - HEDRS Completeness2 3
23 Figure created from statistics provided by NAVSEALOGCEN
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HEDRS ENVELOPE DIMENSIONS % COMPLETE
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Figure 3.7 - HEDRS Envelope Dimension Completeness24
24 Figure created from statistics provided by NAVSEALOGCEN
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Navy Standardization Organization
The responsibility for standardization within the Navy is found in the Navy
Departmental Standardization Office (DepSO). The DepSO in turn can delegate authority to
Standardization Management Activities. The DepSO answers ultimately to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition. Figure 3.8 illustrates the broad Department of Defense
organization for standardization.
DoD Organization for Standardization
Under SecDef (Acquisition)
Asst SecDef (Production & Logistics)
I PDASD (Production & Logistics) |
Dep Asst SecDef (Production Resources)
chaired by
PDASD(P&L) DefenseStandardization
Council
composed of __
Standardization
Executives
Navy SE = RADM Wm Morris
ASN (RD&A) APIA
(Acquasion Policy. Inlegry, Accounlabdly)
ASN Standardization POC:
n' n r s h Ihol
OASD (PR) Manufacturing
Modernization Directorate
Standardization
Program Division
of OASD (PR) MMD
0I Navy
DepSOs: Army, Navy, Air Force, Def Logistics Agency iDePS °
"Departmental SEA 05042
Standardization Office" Standardization Management Activities
Figure 3.8 - DOD Organization for Standardization25
25 Bosworth, CDR M.; Navy Standardization Policy Background and Issues; presentation 11/25/92
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The Navy DepSO reports to the Navy Standardization Executive. The DepSO currently
assigns responsibility within NAVSEA. Figure 3.9 illustrates this organization. Although on
the surface it appears that a broad organization and the mandate is in place to deal with
standardization, this organization is geared towards Navy specification preparation, review and
promulgation rather than equipment and component standardization. In March of 1992, the
Naval Audit Service determined that there was no coordinated approach within the Navy to
manage the standardization of HM&E equipment. The DepSO has broad responsibility and
has indicated that the resources are not available to do the job right. Furthermore, while other
services' DepSO's are at the secretariat/headquarters level, the Navy DepSO is not at such a
high level. The Navy Standardization Executive also has broad responsibility and few assets.
An Equipment Standardization Program steering committee and working group exists within
NAVSEA, but is part time and ad-hoc.
The Affordability Through Commonality (ATC) program has seven full time
participants and ten part time participants focusing on standardization and modularity for
targeted case studies. Figure 3.10 illustrates the organizational matrix for standardization and
commonality within the Navy. This Figure illustrates the point that the standardization
organization is weak and lacks the resources to do the job. NAVSEALOGCEN develops tools
for standardization because it recognizes that standardization will have a positive impact upon
the supply system. Although NAVSEALOGCEN realizes that standardization could simplify
its job in the future, it also suffers from a lack of resources in the current budgetary climate.
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Figure 3.9 - NAVSEA Organization 2 6 I
Figure supplied by NAVSEA
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Figure 3.10 - NAVSEA Organizational Matrix27
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27 Figure supplied by NAVSEA
Much of the responsibility for HM&E standardization has fallen into the hands of the
Naval Sea Logistics Center, which has been concerned with reducing ILS costs. The Naval
Surface Warfare Center in Annapolis, Md. (formerly DTRC) is responsible for studying
equipment with regard to reliability and performance, and has on occasion promoted the
development of standard designs to solve these problems. With standardization receiving more
attention these days, NSWC finds itself in a position where it is necessary to demonstrate that a
project has standardization or ILS implications in order to maintain its budget.
In his brief (11/25/92) to RADM Firebaugh, CDR M. Bosworth stated that for
standardization to move forward the organization will need to change. It was suggested that
the DepSO be moved to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy level (RD&A). This would put
standardization at the same high level within the Navy that it has in other services (like the Air
Force and Army). Such a move would improve lines of communication and give higher level
attention to standardization. Unfortunately, it is not clear that the ASN would have any more
resources than NAVSEA to devote to standardization, and NAVSEA has a better technical
understanding of the problems. The actual work would still need to be accomplished in
NAVSEA, NAVSEALOGCEN and other activities.
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CHAPTER 4: INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
Some mention has been made of Integrated Logistics Support and its contribution to
life cycle cost. Life Cycle Cost (LCC) refers to the total cost of ownership of a system, in this
case a ship. The LCC for a naval ship is typically broken down into non-recurring costs and
recurring costs. Non-recurring costs are typically those costs dealing with the design and
construction of the ship, as well as the initial fleet introduction package. The recurring costs
typically include the operating and support costs as well as the costs of managing the system
over its life.
Integrated Logistics Support, or ILS, refers to a systems management approach linking
system support to system design adopted in response to the fact that the cost of supporting a
system after initial acquisition is a major element of the life cycle cost of the system. ILS
encompasses both non-recurring and recurring costs. Non-recurring fleet introduction costs
can be considered Integrated Logistic Support, as the Fleet Introduction Plan develops the
support plan for the ship. The majority of the recurring life cycle costs are planned for during
ILS. Those elements of life cycle cost which are typically considered at this phase are
represented by the shaded portions of Figure 4.0.
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Figure 4.0- Broad Life Cycle Cost Breakdown
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C
The operating and support costs are well over 50% of the life-cycle costs on some
systems and equipment.28 Figure 4.1 illustrates this point for a typical small amphibious ship.
The Figure points out major elements responsible for the weight, construction cost and life
cycle cost of the ship.
Figure 4.1 - Weight and Cost as a Percentage of light ship weight and total cost29
Integrated Logistics Support strives to be "integrated" because many aspects of support
are interrelated both before and after a project comes into being. The decisions that will largely
determine ILS expenditures are made considerably earlier than the actual expenditure of the
funds. Figure 4.2 illustrates this point.
28 Biedenbender, Dick; Eisaman, John; Vryn, Florence; The ILS Manager's LSA Toolkit:
Availability Engineering; p. 326; McGraw-Hill; 1993, New York
29 adapted from a presentation by Tom Rivers of NAVSEA 05D51/05R33 for the Affordability Through
Commonality Project, October 1992
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Figure 4.2 - Commitment vs. Expenditure3 0
The Department of Defense defines Integrated Logistics Support as:
"A disciplined, unified and iterative approach to the management and technical activities
necessary to:
Integrate support considerations into system and equipment design
Develop support requirements that are related consistently to readiness
objectives, to design and to each other;
30 Figure adapted from:
Biedenbender, Dick; Eisaman, John; Vryn, Florence; The ILS Manager's LSA Toolkit:
Availability Engineering; p. 326; McGraw-Hill; 1993, New York
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Acquire the required support, and
Provide the required support during the operational phase at minimum cost."
There are essentially two ways to reduce ILS costs. One can streamline the ILS
process such that the cost per item requiring ILS is reduced. One can also strive to reduce the
number of items, or types of items that require ILS. Standardization provides benefits in both
these areas. Standardization strives to reduce the number and variety of
equipment/components in the supply system. Standardization also provides an opportunity to
insure that only reliable and maintainable equipment finds its way onto Navy ships, thereby
reducing the ILS cost per item. By standardizing, conceivably more of the same items require
the same spares, improving availability. In conjunction with efforts to minimize the
introduction of new items of supply, the ILS process must be studied, benchmarked against
more efficient operations in other industries, and streamlined to reduce the cost of ILS per item
remaining in the supply system.
It has been mentioned that ideally one would be able to quantifiably evaluate all the
merits of a particular standardization proposal in monetary terms. An evaluation of all
standardization benefits cannot be made in terms of dollars since many of the benefits are
intangibles. It can also be very difficult to obtain the data required to evaluate standardization
in these terms. The impact upon ILS can be estimated in terms of dollars and cents, and is an
important element of the total life cycle cost impact of standardization. A broad defense and
industrial study conducted in the 1960's concluded that 40% of the benefits accrued from
standardization were in the area of logistics.31 Interviews with both Navy and Industry
personnel indicate logistics is no less important today. The evaluation of these costs is
important at several phases of project development and to both the Navy and a contractor.
31 Biedenbender, Dick; Eisaman, John; Vryn, Florence; The ILS Manager's LSA Toolkit:
Availability Engineering; p. 91; McGraw-Hill; 1993, New York
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Once a standard component exists, it is important to be able to evaluate when savings in
another area, such as reduced acquisition cost or improved performance, makes introducing an
equipment other than the standard worthwhile. The same considerations can also be made for
"supportable" rather than strictly "standard" equipment. In these cases, the majority of the
ILS costs are already being incurred for that piece of equipment and the installation of the same
equipment will not increase the total ILS cost to the Navy.
The vast majority of equipment used by the Navy is procured through performance
specifications. This procurement philosophy is intended to provide greater flexibility with
respect to equipment design and competition, which is intended to produce better quality at the
lowest possible price. The traditional method for measuring the economic advantage of
competition is to compare the difference in procurement prices. This practice only makes sense
for those situations where no follow on logistical support and life cycle costs are anticipated,
which is very rare. The practice also does not consider the differing impact two pieces of
equipment may have upon the construction cycle. When follow on logistics support is
required, which is the case for almost all Navy equipment, additional economic considerations
must be evaluated to realistically measure the net savings resulting from competition. These
considerations typically were not considered in the past, since the bill of the life cycle cost
would be passed on in the next fiscal years.
In accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (part 14), the Government is
authorized to incorporate economic evaluation criteria in procurement contracts. Savings
resulting from competitive procurement of functionally interchangeable equipment is equal to
the actual savings resulting from the least cost equipment procurement minus the costs
associated with the increased needs for logistics and infrastructure support of more items.
It has become more common for an ILS life cycle cost evaluation requirement to be part
of a contract. The intent is to require the contractor to evaluate the ILS costs associated with
the use of a non-standard item in lieu of an item on the standard parts list. This has caused
some confusion for shipbuilders whose job is to perform the evaluation when they would
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prefer to use another item. For example, as part of the requirements for the Sealift Conversion
and New Construction Contracts (October 2, 1992), CDRL B084 is invoked. Block 16 of that
CDRL requires ILS Life Cycle Costs to be determined:
"The contractor shall prepare a request for standardization exception
where there is no standard item that meets the specification requirements or no
standard item that can be purchased in time to meet schedules or if the available
standard is not the best or most effective design choice. Include in the request a
tabulation of ILS Life Cycle costs associated with introduction of the non-
standard equipment."
Additionally, the revised General Specifications for Ships of the United States Navy includes
standardization requirements in Section 070, design and construction.
A variety of ILS and Life Cycle Cost models have been developed within DOD, the
Navy specifically, and industry. There is considerable confusion on the part of both the Navy
and contractors as to what is an appropriate solution. A number of models were evaluated as
part of this research.
Such a model must look at the incremental additional ILS cost or savings of utilizing or
not utilizing a standard equipment or component. A tradeoff exists between the accuracy of a
model and the ease with which it can be used. The model should be simple enough to be easily
understood and adapted to a need which may be outside the parameters initially considered in
the model's development. If the model is complicated enough to require the aid of a computer,
the model should be easily transportable from one organization to another, regardless of the
type of computers the organization is using.
A total model to evaluate the value of standardizing must also include the incremental
costs of standardization projects. These costs of standardization include the fixed costs of a
standards development group, investment in R&D or adaptation costs from subsequent use of
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overrated equipment. Savings attributable to standardization in areas other than logistics must
also be considered in an evaluation of the standardization function, but are not critical for the
type of evaluation required of contractors.
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Naval Sea Logistics Center ILS Cost Algorithm 3 2
The ILS Cost Analysis Model, associated with introduction of new equipment to the
Navy, has as an objective the development of a logical, rational methodology to accurately
evaluate the Integrated Logistics Support Costs associated with the introduction of a new item
to the supply system. The increased pressure to minimize cost has forced the Navy to focus
considerable attention on improved efficiency and economics. The analysis is intended to:
Provide a reproducible, logical, and conservative mathematical model
for the assessment of costs associated with objective ILS variables,
Provide a consistent criteria to objectively evaluate the cost proposals
submitted in competitive procurements where the basis for competition
is a performance specification, and
Provide a rational basis to develop budget and fiscal requirements
associated with ILS.
The model identifies a number of cost drivers and attempts to estimate the
incremental costs associated with the introduction of a currently unsupported equipment or
component to the supply system. The model was first introduced in 1986, and many of these
cost drivers are currently out of date. For this reason, current cost data was sought for this
study. Unfortunately, efforts to update the cost coefficients used in the model were not
successful. This was largely due to the fact that many of the costs were not accounted for in
32 The NAVSEALOGCEN model was developed by Richard Jones, Director of the Hull, Electrical
and Auxiliary division of the Naval Sea Logistics Center. The model algorithm description and
original cost factors are attributable to him.
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typical transactions. It may be possible to update the cost coefficients through the application
of an extensive interview process. Discussions with key players which should have access to
this information indicated that it would take quite some time to update the Figures. Time
constraints did not permit this. The model in its original form has been successfully used by
contractors in their ILS cost evaluation of non-standard equipment. The model has been
generalized to allow for introduction of up to date cost data at any time. The following
description presents the model, along with the original cost drivers and the updated cost
drivers.
Cost of Provisional Technical Documentation (PTD)
PTD is necessary to develop adequate support. Normally this cost is buried in the initial
contract price for HM&E equipment. Accordingly, very little data is available on which to base
an objective estimate of the value of PTD. This variable, however, is considered virtually
meaningless in the context of this analysis, if during the competitive procurement the
requirement for PTD is exercised and included as part of the contract price. In this situation,
all competitive quotes must include the cost of PTD. Therefore:
CPTD=O
in this analysis in order to avoid double-counting of this cost.
Cost of Provisioning (Cp)
Support must be developed for each new piece of equipment introduced to the Navy.
The process which accomplishes the development of support is known as provisioning. In this
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process PTD is analyzed, maintenance philosophies are developed, management data is
developed, parts are cataloged, initial supply support quantities are projected and procured,
and all relevant support data are loaded to data files. The result of the data files loading is an
Allowance Parts List (APL) which fully describes intended maintenance philosophies and
requisite parts support. This cost is based upon the number of parts making up the equipment
or component which are new items of supply versus current items of supply. This evolution
requires substantial resources which can be estimated by the following equation:
Cp= Cpl + Cp2 (NPN) + Cp3 (PN)
where:
NPN = Number of Parts Representing New Items of Supply
PN = Number of Parts Currently in the Supply System
Cp = fixed provisioning cost
Cp2 = cost per new item of supply
Cp3 = cost per part currently in supply system
FACTOR $ 1986
Cpl 450
Cp2 300
Cp3 75
Initially, a practical means for estimating the value of this variable, as well as all others, is to
assume that the number of parts contained in the piece of equipment will be the same as that in
the competed alternative. A further credible assumption is that 25% of the parts identified in
any HM&E equipment PTD will represent new items of supply and that 75% will represent
current items of supply. For Electronics, only 15% represent new items of supply and 85%
represent current items of supply so:
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Cp= Cpl + 0.25 Cp2 (P) + 0.75 Cp3 (P) for HM&E
Cp= Cpl + 0.15 Cp2 (P) + 0.85 Cp3 (P) for Electronics
where:
P = Number of different Parts in the equipment to be competed
Cost of NSN/APL Maintenance (CM)
Part of the cost of new equipment to the Navy resulting from competition is an increase
in the universe of parts which must be supported by the Supply System. Costs associated with
the management of these additional (new) parts can be quantified and, in fact, represent a
negative benefit to the desirability of competition. The initial costs associated with NSN
maintenance are those related to the provisioning evolution which is covered by the section on
Cost of Provisioning. This section deals exclusively with costs associated with the annual
maintenance of new items of supply. Two variables must be considered to effectively estimate
the costs associated with the maintenance of new items of supply resulting from competition.
These variables are:
1. the number of new items of supply to be managed, and
2. the projected life cycle for the new items.
CM= Cml (NP) (L)
where:
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NP = Number of New Items of Supply
L = Projected Life Cycle of Equipment
Cml = Annual cost to maintain an item of supply
Based on a 1981 Department of the Army report, the annual cost to maintain an item in the
supply system is $ 448.
Taking into account estimates for the percentages of new items of supply...
CM = Cml (0.25) (P) (L) for HM&E
CM = Cml (0.15) (P) (L) for Electronic
Cost of Training (CT)
Increased training costs resulting from the introduction of new equipment is a function
of numerous variables. Depending on the complexity of the equipment, these costs are a
function of:
a. length of training required,
b. training aids, tools and support equipment,
c. development of course material and text books,
d. maintenance parts support,
e. training site costs, and
f. travel and labor costs for both students and
instructors.
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For this model a more conservative and considerably simplified estimate is used based on the
following assumptions:
1. The new equipment is being introduced as a competitive alternative, rather than
as a new application. All training requirements for the original equipment have been
established. Therefore, there is no cost impact related to items a, c, e, and f above.
In other words, it is being assumed that training programs exist for the standard item
and the incremental additional cost of utilizing a non-standard item involves an
extension or equipment modification of current training courses and equipment.
2. With respect to item b, it is assumed that two pieces of equipment will be required
to augment current training facilities.
3. With respect to item d, maintenance, repair and occasional replacements
will cost an average of 50% of training hardware capital costs per year for
the expected life cycle training requirements.
4. Need for training will be eliminated 4 years prior to the projected life of the equipment
application.
Based on the above assumptions:
CT= 2 (PR) + 0.5 (2) (PR) (L-4)
where:
PR = Unit Price of the Equipment
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= Life of the Equipment Application
so...
CT = PR (L-2)
The Management Consulting Directorate of the Office of the Auditor General of the
Navy has made several recommendations regarding the ILS cost algorithm. One of these
recommendations was a change to the cost of training. The cost of training associated with the
introduction of any new piece of equipment will automatically require a minimum of one senior
technician to review course material, to liaison with manufacturing representatives, to ensure
training is pertinent, and to visit manufacturer's plants.
Therefore:
CT = Ctl + 2(PR) + .5(2)(PR)(L-4).
Where:
Ctl = Fixed cost training
This cost was assessed as at least $2000 in 1989. It should be noted that shipyard ILS
managers believe that the cost of training as defined by this model is exaggerated. They
believe that the model assumes the equipment in question requires lengthy training, which may
not always be the case.
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Cost of Technical Manuals(CTM)
The estimate of the cost to develop and print technical manuals for HM&E equipment
covers a wide range of values. The cost is approximated by the following equation:
CTM= Ctml (P) + Ctm2 (POP)
Where:
P = number of parts
POP = number of equipment procured
Ctml = cost per Part Number
Ctm2 = cost per copy of the technical manual
However, since our interest is in the incremental additional cost of using a new item of
supply, the cost per copy of the manual is effectively zero since we can assume the same
number of manuals are required regardless of which equipment is procured.
CTM = Ctml (P)
The Management Consulting Report recommended a change to the cost of technical
manuals. The cost of technical manuals for standard hull and mechanical systems which are
basically commercial items and have commercial technical manuals may be zero. However, the
ordinance and electronic systems are generally government specific and their manuals must
conform closely to specifications. In such cases, reproduction and changes cost $200-$300
per page, with 20-30 pages average. A one time added cost is recommended for electronic
systems.
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CTM = Ctm3 + Ctml (P).
Factor 1986
Ctml $62.50
Ctm2 $20.00
Ctm3 was evaluated to be $5000 by the Management Consulting Directorate in 1989.
Cost of Installation Drawing Changes (CD)
Assuming that equipment introduced as a result of performance specification
competitive procurements meet only those functional requirements of the application, it is
reasonable to assume variations in form and fit will exist between the original equipment and
the competed equipment. Differences in these variables will result in the need for installation
drawings revisions. There is a cost associated with these changes:
CD=Cd 1 (CL)
where:
CL
Cdl
= Number of Classes of Ships Receiving Equipment
= Cost per ship class affected
In 1986 Cdl was estimated to be $1000.
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Cost of Configuration Control (CCC)
Identification of equipment is the single most important factor in the development of
consolidated shipboard allowance lists (COSAL's). The principal mechanism for reporting
configuration changes is the OPNAV 4790/CK form which is necessary to adjust the WSF
configuration records. Assuming that the introduction of competitively procured equipment
will result in the need for OPNAV 4790/CK forms for all applications, this cost can be Figured
as follows:
CCC = CCCI(POP)
where:
POP = Number of Pieces of Equipment Competitively Procured
CCC1 = Cost to process an OPNAV 4790/CK
SECAS representatives indicated that processing cost $20 in 1986.
Cost of Testing (COT) (in dollars)
One of the basic premises of this model is that procurement specification is a
performance specification. The implication is that performance testing is necessary to assure
product conformance. Costs associated with testing are integrated into the competition
quotations. The option to waive testing requirements can be made by the Government. In
view of the above, no performance testing costs need to be developed in the cost competition
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analysis, since these costs are included as part of the bid and the purpose of this ILS model is
to provide a trade-off analysis. Therefore:
COT=O
Cost of Planned Maintenance (CPM) (in dollars)
Although Planned Maintenance (PMS) is an integral part of ILS, consideration in the
economic analysis related to competitive procurement is negligible. If PMS is required to
support the original equipment, the assumption is made that similar maintenance will be
required by the competed equipment. There is a cost to identify repair parts on the individual
maintenance requirement cards (MRC's), a review of the original MRC's to assure
compatibility with the competed equipment and promulgation of new MRC's. Therefore:
CPM= CPMI
When the model was initially developed, this value was estimated at $500.
Summing all the elements, the ILS cost is as follows:
C = Cptd + Cp + Cm + Ct + Ctm + Cd + Ccc + Cot + Cpm
Where:
C
Cptd
= ILS Costs
= Cost of Provisioning Technical Documentation
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Cp = Cost of Provisioning
Cm = Cost of Maintenance
Ct = Cost of Training
Ctm = Cost of Technical Manuals
Cd = Cost of Installation Drawing Changes
Ccc = Cost of Configuration Control
Cot = Cost of Testing
Cpm = Cost of Planned Maintenance
Substituting the original cost data, the model for mechanical components is summarized below:
C=950+ 193.75(P) + 112(P) (L) + (PR)(L) +1000(CL) + 20(POP) - 2(PR)
and for electronic equipment:
C=950+ 171.25(P) + 67.2(P) (L) + (PR)(L) +1000(CL) + 20(POP) - 2(PR)
where:
C = ILS Costs
P = Number of parts in the original equipment
L = Life cycle of the equipment in years
PR = Price of the original material (in dollars)
CL = Number of classes of ships receiving the equipment
POP = Number of equipment competitive procured
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Defense Electronic SuDDly Center (DESC) Model3 3
Mr. Charles E. Gastineau of the Defense Electronics Supply Center found that four
factors account for 80% of the total life cycle costs of a part with regard to standardization
efforts:
The cost of preparing a document that describes the nonstandard
part, taking into account the labor charges, overhead, burden, and
other charges related to document preparation.
The cost to test nonstandard parts
The cost of managing a part in the inventory
The cost incurred in maintenance owing to the reliability or
unreliability of a nonstandard part.
A simple algorithm for determining these four costs was developed based in part upon
the National Aerospace Standard 1524 and another model developed by the Air Force Institute
of Technology. The intent of the model was to serve as a tool to measure the cost difference
between using a standard part or not using a standard part in conjunction with the Military
33 Gastineau, Charles; Kerr, Donald; "Don't Cry: Justify"; The Economics of Standardization; Toth,
Robert ed.
a secondary source of a description of the model was
Corbett, John; Standardization of Hull. Mecahnical and Electrical Equipment Inventory; MS
thesis; Naval Postgraduate School 1987
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Parts Control Program. The NAVSEALOGCEN model is based, in part, upon the DESC
model. The basic philosophy chosen was:
Vso = Lcc - Is
Where:
Vso = the value of the standard
Lcc = the life cycle cost avoidance from using the standard part(s) which is
the sum of the four costs avoided as above
Is = Investment in the standard
Although this model was developed in the early 1970's, the philosophy is still sound.
As with the NAVSEALOGCEN model, a generalized presentation is given, with comments on
the cost data.
Non-Standard Part Documentation
This cost represents the additional costs incurred to prepare documentation to assure
that a manufacturer has complete definition of the requirements, and that the activity can
purchase the same part in later logistic support and production. Detailed drawings will be
required for configuration control. The National Aerospace Standards Committee studied the
effort required to prepare such drawings in 1973. They found that these statistics varied
considerably. It took an engineer between two and 145 hours to develop a drawing for a new
part and 67% of the necessary drawings were for new parts.
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DOC = (MH)($/MH)(%ND)
Where:
DOC
$/MH
MH
%ND
= Documentation Cost Avoidance
= Cost per Man-hour
= Number of man-hours required
= % New drawings
In 1973 the industry
taken as 50%.
average was $25 per man-hour. The % new drawings has generally been
Non-Standard Part Testing
A requirement to test and evaluate a non-standard part can represent a very significant
cost as compared to a standard part which requires no such testing and evaluation.
TEST = (%PT)($/T)
Where:
TEST
%PT
sir
= Testing costs avoided
= Percentage of parts tested
= Average cost per test
Surveys made by DOD Military Parts Control Advisory Groups (MPCAGS) in the
70's established the average costs for testing to range from $5000 to $75000 for electronic
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parts and $4800 on average for mechanical parts. The National Aerospace Standards
Committee study indicated that 70% of all parts are tested. When utilizing a model such as
this, it is important to be confident in the cost data. There are always exceptions to average
Figures. One should try to validate the cost data and err on the side of conservatism.
Item Management Cost
According to the same National Aerospace Standards Committee (NASC) survey, parts
drawings list an average of 7.3 parts per drawing. The study concluded that of these 7.3 parts,
only three were usually provisioned and assigned stock numbers. The item management cost
is the additional cost accrued from entering a stock number into the logistic system and
maintaining it for a period of time. This cost is made up of both a one time fixed cost as well
as the annual maintenance cost.
IM = [($/C)+(y)(M$/y)](%ND)(NPN)
Where:
IM = Inventory Management Cost over y years
$/C = Cataloging Cost (one-time cost)
y = Number of years of the study
M$/y = Annual Management Cost
NPN = Number of New Parts Per Drawing
The NASC survey suggested that a ten year life expectancy before a part needed to be
upgraded was reasonable. DESC estimated that it cost $207 a year to enter a part into the
supply system and $165 to manage the part.
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Maintenance Cost Impact
Using standard parts of known, proven reliability has been shown to significantly
reduce field failures, thereby lowering the life cycle costs. This cost is modeled as follows:
MC = (y)($R/y)
Where:
MC
$R/y
= Maintenance Costs Avoided
- Annual repair costs
The DESC model
parts.
used $300 per year for electronics, but set the value to zero for other types of
TOTAL SAVINGS
Summing the four elements yields the total ILS savings per part as follows:
CA = (MH)($/MH)(%ND) + (%PT)($/T)+[($/C)+(y)(M$/y)](%ND)(NPN) + (y)($R/y)
Where:
CA
$/MH
MH
= Cost Avoidance
= Cost per Man-hour
= Number of man-hours required
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%ND = % New drawings
%PT = Percentage of parts tested
$/T = Average cost per test
$/C = Cataloging Cost (one-time cost)
y = Number of years of the study
M$/y = Annual Management Cost
NPN = Number of New Parts Per Drawing
$R/y = Annual repair costs
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Corbett Standardization Costing Model3 4
John Corbett developed a model incorporating what he felt were the best elements of
the NAVSEALOGCEN and the DESC models and presented this model in the referenced
thesis. As was the case with the NAVSEALOGCEN model, the assumption was made that
maintenance associated with the new non-supported equipment would be similar to those of the
supported equipment and therefore could be ignored. This models also assumes that the
training costs associated with the non-supported equipment are similar to the supported
equipment and can be ignored. The model separates one time costs from annual costs in order
to make the short term and long term impacts more obvious. The model was developed with a
ten year equipment life in mind, but can be applied to other life spans. The model also
introduces a factor to account for multiple equipment.
NON-RECURRING COSTS
The model utilizes the following non-recurring costs:
* Non-Standard Technical Data
* Provisioning
* Testing
* Technical Manuals
* Installation Drawings
* Training Equipment
* Planned Maintenance
34 Corbett, John Charles; "Standardization of Hull, Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Inventory";
MS Thesis, Sept. 1987, Naval Postgraduate School
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Non-Standard Technical Data is data necessary to insure proper support of an item introduced
into the supply system. This cost is modeled by both the NAVSEALOGCEN model and the
DESC model. Mr. Corbett felt that the NAVSEALOGCEN model overestimated this cost
contribution. For this reason, he chose to utilize the DESC estimate which was based upon the
NAS model.
DOC = (MH)($/MH)[(NSP)/4](E)
Where:
DOC = Technical Documentation Cost
MH = Number of man-hours required
$/MH = Cost per Man-hour
NSP = Number of non-standard parts
E = Number of new equipment
In 1982, DESC cited a Figure of $52/hour and 27 man-hours per drawing on average.
The Provisioning cost estimate was left consistent with the NAVSEALOGCEN model.
Cp= Cpl + (Cp2 (NPN) + Cp3 (PN))E
where:
NPN = Number of Parts Representing New Items of Supply
PN = Number of Parts Currently in the Supply System
Cp1 = fixed provisioning cost
Cp2 = cost per new item of supply
Cp3 = cost per part currently in supply system
E = Number of new equipment
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The model adopts the DESC TESTING cost. Corbett suggests raising the DESC estimate of
25% tested to 50% tested. In 1982 DESC increased the cost per test to $7,872.
TEST = (%PT)($/T)
Where:
TEST
%PT
$/T
= Testing costs avoided
= percentage of parts tested
= Average cost per test
The cost of Technical Manuals was estimated as in the NAVSEALOGCEN model. Mr.
Corbett did not have an opportunity to include the recommendations of the Management
Consulting Report, which were made after his study.
CTM= Ctml (P) + Ctm2 (POP)
Where:
P
POP
Ctml
Ctm2
= number of parts
= number of equipment procured
= cost per Part Number
= cost per copy of the technical manual
With Ctm = $62.50 and Ctm2 = $20.00 in the original model.
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The cost of Installation Drawing Changes was calculated as in the NAVSEALOGCEN model.
CD=Cd 1(CL)
where:
CL = Number of Classes of Ships Receiving Equipment
Cdl = Cost per ship class affected
In 1986 Cdl was estimated to be $1000.
The non-recurring costs for Training Equipment are calculated similarly to the
NAVSEALOGCEN model.
CT = 2(PR)
Where:
PR
PR
= The cost of Training Equipment
= The equipment unit price
The model utilizes the
cost, labeling it CPM.
NAVSEALOGCEN approach to the non-recurring Planned Maintenance
In 1986 CPM was estimated to be $500.
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS
The model considers the following annual operating costs:
* NSN Management Costs
* Training
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Configuration Control
The NSN Management Costs were calculated as in the NAVSEALOGCEN model.
CM= Cml (NP) (L)
where:
NP
L
Cml
= Number of New Items of Supply
= Projected Life Cycle of Equipment
= Annual cost to maintain an item of supply
Based on a 1981 Department of the Army report, the annual cost to maintain an item in the
supply system is $ 448.
The annual cost of Training is calculated differently than in either the NAVSEALOGCEN or
DESC models. The approach is similar to that of the NAVSEALOGCEN model, except that it
is assumed that training costs accrue until the equipment is replaced.
CT = PR
Where:
CT
PR
= The annual training cost
= Unit price of the equipment
Configuration Control costs are calculated somewhat differently than in the
NAVSEALOGCEN model. The failure rate of the equipment in question is considered in this
model.
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CC = CC1(BRF)(NSP)(E)
Where:
CC = Cost of Configuration Control
CC1 = Notional cost per equipment
BRF = Failure rate of the parts
NSP = Number of non-standard parts
E = Number of equipment
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National Aerospace Standard 1524: Standardization Savings. Identification
and Calculation 3 5
The National Aerospace Standard is very popular due to its ease of use and level of
detail. NAS 1524 identifies 52 benefits (tangible and intangible) associated with the use of a
standard or standard component. Not all the benefits may be attributed to a single standard,
that is to say that some benefits are mutually exclusive.
The practices detailed in NAS 1524 provide methodologies for calculating savings and
cost avoidance as a result of utilization of a standard. Although the standard was developed
with the aerospace industry in mind, and the Figures and examples cited in NAS 1524 are for
aerospace projects, it is not difficult to apply the approach to the marine industry. The
following are considered.
Savingsfrom increased quantity purchases
An example of savings attributable to quantity purchases may be the discount received by
obtaining options on equipment for an entire class of ships through a quality partnership
with the vendors of equipment on a class standard equipment list.
* Savings in paperwork and handling
An example may be the savings attributable to the reduced number of purchase orders that
may be associated with utilization of standard versus non-standard equipment.
· Savingsfrom reduced storage requirements
35 Aerospace Industries Association of America, "National Aerospace Standard 1524 -
Standardization Savings, Identification and Calculation", The Economics of Standardization, Toth,
Robert ed.
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This savings is significant for both the Navy and the shipbuilder. A standardization project
reducing the variety of valves used in a particular ship or class of ships would reduce the
storage space required both at the shipyard and at the Navy's supply center.
* Savingsfrom reduced engineering search time
This savings is attributable to the reduced effort required to find required engineering data
which may be more readily available as a result of conglomerating data pertaining to a
standard family of equipment into a standard reference guide. For example, utilization of a
class standard list of equipment or pre-qualified vendors would reduce the time spent by
engineers searching through VFI to find an applicable component. Creation of a database
(such as an extension of HEDRS) which contains important VFI for supported equipment
would also reduce engineering time. Use of standard patterns/panels and modules is
another example of an activity which would reduce engineering search time.
* Savings from using a stocked standard part in lieu of establishing a new standard
This is a useful trade-off between updated performance a new standard may deliver and the
savings from utilizing an existing standard. The assumption here is that the new item
would be considered a standard as well and that there is a cost associated with establishing
it as a standard as well as a cost associated with adding it to the supply system.
* Savings from control and reduction of the number of items in inventory through
simplification or use of a supersedure procedure
This savings is associated with the cost of maintaining an item in the supply system and is
annual. This savings is similar to that modeled in the NAVSEALOGCEN model. NAS
1524 points out correctly that these savings may be derived by NOT introducing a new
item into the supply system or by introducing the item and eliminating another. In essence,
the new item would be considered interchangeable with the old equipment and would take
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its place in the supply system. The SUPERSEDURE approach may prove to be a useful
process in developing a flexible standardization policy. A problem with supersedure is
that, in the case of equipment, it would often require replacement of the entire equipment
with the new item rather than utilization of a replacement part once all remaining
maintenance spares have been used up. This is one more trade-off which must be
considered.
* Savings from using a stocked standard part in lieu of using a non-stocked part
This savings differs from that discussed earlier in that the assumption here is that the new
item is of existing design and would not be considered a standard part even though it
would be supported in the supply system. This savings more closely resembles the
NAVSEALOGCEN model, since the NAVSEALOGCEN model does not consider costs
associated with creating standard equipment lists etc.
* Savings from using a design standard in lieu of detailing the data completely on the
drawing
Standard foundations, arrangements, attachments, patterns/panels and modules are all
examples of savings opportunities in this area. By utilizing standard baseline designs
which have a high frequency of application throughout a ship or class, significant savings
could be achieved in this area.
NAS identified five costs typically associated with inventory. These include:
* Interest on invested capital
* Insurance charges
* Cost of warehouse space
* Labor cost to maintain stock
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Cost of obsolescence, surplus, breakage etc.
NAS also identified six costs typically associated with introducing a new item into the supply
system.
a Engineering time
· Drafting time
· Checking and release time
· Evaluation or qualification tests
Preparation of initial procurement and stocking documents
Preparation of initial inspection plans
The NAS document is very complete and easily understood. The NAS standard differs
significantly from the NAVSEALOGCEN, CORBETT and DESC approaches in that it covers
a broader range of standardization savings. The other models consider costs directly related to
traditional Integrated Logistics Support operations and costs, while NAS more realistically
considers a broader range of Life Cycle costs. The NAVSEALOGCEN model would be
appropriate for calculating the savings attributable to NOT introducing a new item of supply as
outlined above, but does not consider the broader range of benefits and costs associated with
standard equipment. For this reason, those models can only be a piece in the puzzle of
evaluating standardization. Furthermore, the models reviewed are more appropriate for
decisions regarding introduction of non-standard equipment, rather than as a criteria for
standardizing equipment. NAS 1524 is a more detailed approach which may be better suited to
identifying candidates for standardization projects.
- 115 -
Cost Analysis Strateev Assessment (CASA) model
The CASA model was developed by the Defense Systems Management College and is
available as a software package for IBM compatible machines. It was derived from
Honeywell's Total Resource and Cost Evaluation (TRACE) family of logistics and life cycle
cost models which were available for mainframe computers. CASA is based upon ILS
estimating routines developed in the 1970's but provides a user friendly atmosphere with
which to use them. It, like most of the ILS cost models available, is not validated. The
Defense Systems Management College warns users of the model that they should use another
model to cross-check the results as further evidence to any official review group. A detailed
description of the model and the software is available from DSMC in the software manual,
from which much of the following discussion is referenced. The following describes the
model's philosophy and places it in a standardization perspective.
The CASA model is intended to be a life cycle model which covers the entire life of a
system, including initial research costs, yearly maintenance costs, spares, training and other
expenses. The program has a multitude of functions for projecting costs and determining
probabilities of meeting and exceeding life cycle cost targets. Among the tasks CASA is
intended to perform are:
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates
Trade-off analysis
Repair level analysis
Production rate and quantity analysis
Warranty analysis
Spares provisioning
Resource Projections (for manpower and support
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equipment)
Risk and uncertainty analysis
Cost driver sensitivity analysis
Reliability growth analysis
Operational availability analysis
Spares optimization
Operation and support cost contribution
The CASA LCC model is intended to make cost projections for three phases of system
life. These phases include the RDT&E phase, the acquisition phase, and the operation and
support phase. This is a Life Cycle Cost model rather than a model of only logistics support
costs. Some of the other models studied modeled only the integrated logistics support costs.
This will be discussed later.
CASA utilizes RDT&E subcategories to determine the feasibility of a system. RDT&E
subcategories include:
System/Project management cost
System test and evaluation cost
Training cost
Data cost
Demonstration and validation cost
Research and development cost
Software cost
Other cost
The total acquisition cost represents the initial investment cost once the system is
approved to be procured. These costs are those associated with the design, development and
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procurement of systems and support items necessary to make the system operational. CASA
includes costs from the following categories when summing totals for each year of the study to
determine the total acquisition cost:
Production tooling and test equipment cost
Production start up cost
System acquisition cost
System shipping and storage containers cost
Pre-production engineering cost
Pre-production units refurbished cost
Installation cost
Support equipment cost
Hardware spares cost
Spares reusable containers cost
Technical data cost
Initial training cost
Training devices cost
New or modified facilities cost
Initial item management cost
Initial software development cost
Miscellaneous acquisition cost
Warranty price
CASA considers the following elements of operation and support costs:
Operation labor cost
Repair labor cost
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Support equipment maintenance cost
Recurring training cost
Repair parts and material cost
Repair consumables cost
Condemnation spares replenishment cost
Technical data revisions cost
Transportation cost
Recurring facilities cost
Recurring item management cost
Software maintenance cost
Contractor services cost
Engineering changes cost
Miscellaneous operation and support cost
Recurring warranty cost
If a system has a warranty, the CASA model allows some of the cost categories
mentioned to be set to zero while under warranty.
A detailed description of the CASA model algorithms is given in the CASA manual.
As can be seen from a review of the other models presented so far and the listing of CASA
considerations, CASA is a considerably more complex model. The CASA model also differs
in another very important regard. CASA is a generalized model intended to be applied to a
variety of situations. For example, CASA requires the user to enter the cost factors to be used
in the analysis. No baseline cost factors are available to users as a starting point. By
comparison, the NAVSEALOGCEN model is intended strictly for Navy ILS cost
considerations.
Additionally, the costs are grouped differently in the CASA model than in the others.
CASA is intended to serve as a cost estimating model for an entire project, rather than as a tool
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for cost-benefit analysis of a single component separate from the project as a whole. CASA is
intended for detailed Logistics Support Analysis of a project. Given that the model has been
created for a project, the impact of a change in costs associated with a particular component can
be studied in great detail. It is not easy to look at the costs associated with a particular
component without having modeled the entire project.
Such a tool may not be appropriate in the case of cost-benefit analysis of
standardization. In particular, the needs of contractors to evaluate ILS costs to fulfill contract
requirements must be met. In order to facilitate these calculations, it is important that the tool
be easy to use and understand. For this purpose, a model dedicated to Navy ILS costs
associated with non-standard and non-supported equipment may be better suited. The
algorithmic approach used by CASA to calculate components of the Life Cycle Cost is very
detailed and may be applied to a dedicated model. For example, CASA breaks costs down
further than the other models presented so far. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to get
the cost Figures needed for such a detailed evaluation, although it may be possible to get cost
Figures in less detail.
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The FLEX System 3 6
FLEX is a computer system designed to project, track and analyze program life cycle
costs. The intent was to provide a flexible system (thus the name FLEX). The flexibility of
FLEX is what sets it apart from other models. Like CASA, FLEX is intended to serve as an
all purpose system. It is less a model and more a model development system.
FLEX development began with the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) LCC
Implementation Team which was formed from Navy commands and field activities. The
techniques developed were published in 1974. At this point the algorithms were simple in
nature and fixed by cost data and a cost estimating approach similar to those discussed so far.
The system was refined over time through feedback with algorithm users who typically sought
tailored systems for their needs. In the mid 1970's, the algorithm was made available in
computer form as FLEX. FLEX was modified by various users for their purposes. Changes
to the system included the additional capability to account for inflation and discount rates. In
1982 Management Systems Designers incorporated new capabilities such as project tracking
(actual vs. estimated expenditures etc.). At this time the program was "cleaned up" and
developed an integrated data dictionary for use in the model. The model was also tailored to
allow a work breakdown structuring of the costs in addition to the traditional cost elements
used in other models. The FLEX system incorporates life cycle costs in several phases of a
system life such as research and development, investment, operation and support, and
disposal.
In summary, FLEX provides the following four key features:
The model's cost breakdown structure can be tailored to classical
and Work Breakdown Structure formats
36 Information regarding the FLEX system is from the FLEX LCC System Manual, Management
Systems Designers, Inc.
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The model can use a different cost estimating procedure for each
element of the cost breakdown structure.
The model uses a common data base to integrate the data
generated by the various participating functional organizations.
A multiple run tradeoff analysis feature is available for cost tradeoff
analyses. Any element cost estimating procedure or parameter
value can be changed from one run to another.
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The FECA Cost Analysis Model3 7
The Material Readiness Support Agency (MRSA) developed and published a model
known as Front-End Analysis (FEA). The joint project Office for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
has adopted this approach and developed a model known as FECA (Front-End Cost Analysis).
These models are intended to overcome the data burden present in other models. Other
models, such as CASA require many inputs. CASA requires over 400 inputs for a detailed
LCC analysis. FECA utilizes a little over 200 inputs. Another feature of FECA is that it was
developed with computer spreadsheet programs in mind. Rather than developing a computer
program, the association chose to develop a model which was to be used with popular
spreadsheets. This approach is advantageous since there is much more compatibility from
spreadsheet program to spreadsheet program and data from one computer (IBM or IBM clone
for example) can be easily ported to another (Apple Macintosh for example). If a unique
application program had been written, this would have seriously limited the ability to use the
model on any machine. Additionally, use of the spreadsheet is likely to require less training
time than a specialized application since most engineers are already familiar with the use of
popular spreadsheet programs like LOTUS, EXCEL and QUATRO-PRO. The approach also
makes it considerably easier for the user to make modifications to fit his own needs.
Unfortunately, the approach also makes it easier for the user to make an unnoticed error.
37 Information regarding FECA was found in:
Biedenbender, Dick; Eisaman, John; Vryn, Florence; The ILS Manager's LSA Toolkit:
Availability Engineering; McGraw-Hill; 1993, New York
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EvaluatinE The Available Models and Suggestions for Life Cycle/ILS
considerations
Clearly there are a wide variety of models available. The majority of these models use
similar approaches in that each tries to evaluate different elements of logistics and life cycle
support costs. Some of these models, such as CASA, are intended to be used in evaluating
large projects. These models are overly complicated and do not seem to be appropriate for
evaluating individual equipment selection decisions. All of the models are intended to evaluate
systems in terms of whether or not they should be utilized in a particular project. None of the
models are intended to be used to evaluate entire equipment categories for standardization need
or potential. Cost data is difficult to obtain and is usually not in the level of detail necessary for
many of the models presented. Useful analysis could still be done by utilizing cost factors
which represent averages for equipment categories.
In order for standardization to be successful, it is important that a cost evaluating
scheme is available which is both quick and easy to use. Only then will this type of evaluation
be made on a regular basis as required in current acquisition contracts. The author believes that
the NAVSEALOGCEN, DESC, NAS and CORBETT models are most appropriate for this
type of evaluation for naval equipment. The NAVSEALOGCEN model is already being sent
to contractors for their use. The NAVSEALOGCEN model is simple to use and is based on
cost factors derived from Navy acquisition. These cost factors must be updated. An attempt
was made to update these cost factors in the course of this study, but with no success. Many
people were contacted regarding the different aspects of the ILS costs, but it was not possible
to obtain any information which might be used to update the cost factors. This is largely
because costs are not accounted for at a detailed level. The timing and costs associated with
different phases of an acquisition project are not tracked. In order for savings and costs
regarding standardization to be measured in a meaningful way, the timing and costs associated
- 124 -
with the different phases of an acquisition project, from concept development through crew
training and maintenance and logistics support will need to be studied further.
Another important point is that in evaluating costs which are recurring over a number of
years, costs should be discounted to represent the time value of money. The
NAVSEALOGCEN model does not explicitly require the user to incorporate net present value
into the calculations. The present value of an investment accounts for the fact that a dollar
earned or saved today has earning potential in the form of interest. This will tend to reduce the
impact of the costs. NPV also has the effect of reducing the impact of future savings or
expenditures which is appropriate from a risk point of view. The future is unclear, and by
utilizing NPV, costs and savings which occur recently are favored over future costs and
savings which may not be completely trusted.
In summary, the Naval Sea Logistics Center model is an excellent start with regard to
evaluation of specific equipment options for a project, given that savings and costs are
discounted to reflect NPV and cost data is updated and checked for realism. The
NAVSEALOGCEN model could be applied to the broader task of evaluating equipment
categories if aggregate data exists for this purpose. NAVSEALOGCEN supplied some of this
data which is used later to evaluate the ILS costs of the different equipment categories. The
NAVSEALOGCEN model does not incorporate all the costs and savings associated with
standardization projects, since it was intended to evaluate ILS costs only, and must be used in
conjunction with other factors when evaluating standardization projects. The NAS model
incorporates many of the elements of the NAVSEALOGCEN model and goes further,
including other costs and savings. This model serves as a useful guide for broader evaluation.
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CHAPTER 5: CRITERIA AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR EVALUATING
STANDARDIZATION CANDIDATES
In Chapter 3, current work in this area undertaken by NAVSEALOGCEN was
described. The Naval Sea Logistics Center has developed the Standardization Candidate
Selection Criteria Model. This model was developed in response to a need for evaluating the
feasibility of standardizing an equipment based upon nomination by some group within the
Navy. Typically, equipment was nominated as a reaction to poor maintenance records. It was
hoped that by standardizing on a design of known reliability, and providing a depth of spares
in the supply system with reduced breadth, availability and maintainability would improve. The
Standardization Candidate Selection Criteria Model developed by NAVSEALOGCEN provides
a framework for economic analysis based upon the NAVSEALOGCEN ILS model as well as
an analysis of the improved reliability that can be expected. It provides a basis for equipment
candidate selection based upon the availability of sources, drawings, and data rights. The
model outlines the process of checking for a high frequency of unique equipment performing
the same function which may point to standardization opportunity. The NAVSEALOGCEN
model is a good start, but assumes that an item has already been nominated for standardization.
It then checks the feasibility of standardizing the item, generally assuming it to be a new design
to be named the standard. What is needed now is a rational approach to nominating equipment
and ranking this nomination. This nominating process should pinpoint equipment types which
deserve attention in the form of standardized interfaces, class standardization, module design
or standard design development. Figure 5.0 illustrates some of the considerations currently
associated with equipment standardization decisions, and other considerations which are
important in this process.
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Figure 5.0 - Criteria for Selecting Navy HM&E Standardization Candidates
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These criteria guide the gathering of pertinent statistics regarding the equipment types.
Such questions as which equipment to mandate as GFE, or as class standard, or to develop a
module for, or allow the contractor to select, can be answered more readily if these statistics
are available.
In Chapter 3, the 99 equipment categories established by the Navy were discussed.
Within each of these categories are subcategories identified by Lead Allowance Parts List
numbers. Within these subcategories are equipment identified by Allowance Parts List
numbers. The APL usually identifies an item of supply which is unique. Unfortunately, it is
sometimes a variant of another APL which in reality should not warrant a unique classification.
The APL remains the best identifier for equipment in that it is currently the only measure which
is associated with all equipment. Furthermore, the HEDRS database mentioned earlier tracks
APL's and can be utilized to generate statistics regarding equipment tracked as APL's. In this
chapter, the 99 broad equipment categories are evaluated with regard to identifiable criteria. In
reality, these 99 equipment categories are too broad to serve as the basis for standardization
decisions. They do serve as a useful first estimate of standardization opportunities which may
then be refined at the LAPL and APL levels. It is considerably more time consuming to search
at the LAPL level, since each equipment category contains many LAPL categories. This broad
review serves as an exploration of the feasibility of the approach.
A number of criteria were identified. Each of these were selected for its impact on
either the logistics costs, or the production costs, or time to delivery. In some cases the same
criteria impact all three. The criteria explored in this thesis include:
Redundancy and Commonality
Uniqueness
APL Proliferation
Maintenance Data
- 128 -
* Population
* VFI and Manufacturing Lead Time
* Potential ILS Cost Avoidance
* Technology Turnover - Obsolescence
* Adaptive Costs
* Producibility - Critical Path Impact
Each of these is described in the following pages.
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REDUNDANCY AND COMMONALITY
Redundancy refers to the existence of many unique items of supply which perform the
same or very similar functions (i.e. many APL's with the same or similar characteristics). At
the LAPL level, redundancy is most effectively studied through the use of scatter diagrams
which plot points representing APL's having particular characteristics. The approach is best
suited to equipment which can be distinctly defined in terms of a few key characteristics. The
Navy has utilized this approach in the past in determining the feasibility of developing standard
designs in response to reliability concerns. These scatter diagrams are also very useful for
developing envelopes of characteristics which are to be satisfied by the standard or standard
family. The statistics provide empirical evidence of standardization potential with regard to
performance characteristics. Redundancy appears on these illustrations as clusters of APL's
within identifiable envelopes of characteristics which are tight enough to be satisfied by a
single item. There are several questions to ask when evidence of a cluster is visible.
Could all, many, or any, of the items identified as part of the cluster have satisfied the
majority of the performance envelope?
* Could an item be developed to satisfy the performance envelope identified or desired?
The answers to these questions will help to guide any subsequent standardization project
should one be undertaken.
It is also important to check for exact matches which would overlap on scatter diagrams
(in other words a point would represent more than one APL). Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 are
illustrative of this criteria. The Figures illustrate the population of APL'S for centrifugal
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pumps, compressors and dehydrators. These items have been examined by the Navy (DTRC,
NSWC and NAVSEALOGCEN) in an effort to improve reliability.
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Figure 5.1 - Surface Combatant Pump Distribution3 8
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3 8 Figure supplied by NAVSEA
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Figure 5.2 - Fleet Compressor Scatter Plot39
39 Figure supplied by NAVSEA
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In performing the broad study, the total number of APL's in each category was
considered. Each equipment category is broken down into a number of sub-groups, or
LAPL's. Dividing the total number of APL's by the number of LAPL's for the equipment
category give the average number of APL's per LAPL. Translated into English, this roughly
indicates the average number of equipment which warrant an identification number which can
be found in each sub-category. This Figure is only a rough indicator, and is intended only as a
starting point. First, it assumes that the average number of APL's per LAPL at least
distinguishes order of magnitude differences between equipment categories. This is not
always true since some equipment categories have a number of lowly populated LAPL's which
would drive down the average Figure. It further assumes that there is a greater likelihood of
finding redundancy within highly populated LAPL's than within LAPL's which do not
contain as many APL's. In general, this should be true. It should be noted that this measure
gives no indication of the population of the APL's themselves. For example, an LAPL may
have 47 APL's within it, and the fleet may have 300 of each APL installed. On the other hand,
another LAPL may only have 100 APL's within it, but each of those may only have a fleet
population of 50 items. In this case, there may be greater savings if some of the 100 APL's
can be eliminated than if some of the 300 APL's are eliminated. The frequency of application
in a single ship, class or the fleet is also important. All these, and other considerations must be
accounted for. These will be discussed as separate criteria.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the APL population per equipment category, as determined
utilizing information from NAVSEALOGCEN. Dividing through by the number of LAPL's
per equipment category and visualizing the results in a pareto diagram results in Figure 5.4.
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The results allow the following list of the top twenty equipment categories with regard
to APL's per LAPL's to be made:
Strainers
Controllers
Motors
Switches
Yellow Gear (NUKES)
Relays
Filters
Steam Traps
Transformers
Circuit Breakers
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
Valves
Firefighting/Rescue/Safety
Panels
Gages
Fans
Eductors
Switchboards
Condensers
Indicators
Gears and Reducers
TABLE 5.0 - APL/LAPL RANKING
- 137 -
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
UNIOUENESS
One argument for standardization which is often put forward is that it allows economies
of scale. That is to say, if larger quantities of each APL could be utilized, it should result in
more efficient use of Integrated Logistic Support dollars, more timely delivery and possibly
lower acquisition costs. In this regard, there is an incentive to consolidate APL's in those
cases where there are few installations of APL's serving the same or similar purpose. The
information contained in the HEDRS database can be used to shed light on this subject. The
average population per APL for each equipment category was calculated and used to prioritize
the list of equipment categories. Figure 5.6 illustrates the total fleet population of each
equipment category.
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Figure 5.6 - Total Fleet Population
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After evaluating the total number of installations in the fleet, the average number of
installations per APL was calculated by dividing the total fleet population by the total number
of APL's in each equipment category. Once again, this is a rough indicator and is intended as
an illustrative beginning. In order to fully describe the uniqueness of an APL, the actual fleet
population of each APL must be examined. This is a time consuming task which was beyond
the scope of this exercise. Figure 5.7 illustrates the average population per APL.
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The resulting top twenty-one candidates are listed below:
Magnetos
Cranes
Carburetors
Steering Gears
Davits
Windlasses
Switchboards
Elevators
Shop Equipment
Hoists
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
Boilers
Capstans
Audible Alarms
Winches
Small Boat Propulsion
ASW Equipment
Motor Generators
Welding Equipment
Condensers
Ejectors
Generators
Table 5.1 - Uniqueness Criteria
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1)
2')
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
110)
I
APL PROLIFERATION
As was mentioned earlier, the proliferation of new APL numbers into the supply
system is one indicator of the degree of standardization which is being achieved. High APL
proliferation is to be avoided if at all possible, since it may represent needless introduction of
unique items into the supply system resulting in higher ILS costs. High APL proliferation is
also undesirable since it leads to inconsistency across the fleet which may complicate
construction efforts and undermine other standardization efforts. It should be noted that a high
proliferation rate may also be an indicator that a particular equipment category may have a high
technology turnover rate (obsolescence), and this must be considered when reviewing the
results of this survey. The Naval Sea Logistics Center provided data regarding the current
average number of new APL's which are introduced per year per equipment category. A
question exists as to what is an appropriate measure of APL proliferation. One may measure
the actual number of APL's introduced as a raw Figure, or one may measure the APL
proliferation as a percentage of the total number of APL's in each category. Proliferation as a
percentage may be more useful, as it "normalizes" the data for the existing variety of
equipment, indicating when an unusually large number of new APL's is being introduced.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the proliferation of new APL's per equipment category per year. Figure
5.9 illustrates the proliferation as a percentage.
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There is an incentive to try to minimize this proliferation, and a high proliferation
indicates that the reasons behind it should be studied. If these reasons are not found to
adequately justify the proliferation, extra effort could be taken to mandate that currently
supported equipment be utilized. As was discussed during the review of Navy progress,
proliferation does not provide the whole story. APL proliferation should also be studied in the
context of the actual number of units which were acquired in a given year. For example,
proliferation of 3 APL's per year may be more indicative of a problem when only 3 items are
actually acquired in a year than when 100 items are acquired in a year.
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MAINTENANCE DATA
Data from the 3M database was studied by the Naval Sea Logistics Center and a list of
25 "problem" equipment was created. Standardizing upon a more reliable design improves the
reliability of the system and also increases the availability of spares by allowing
NAVSEALOGCEN to cut back on the variety of spares and increase the number of stocked
spares for the standard item. Table 5.2 lists the 25 equipment along with maintenance action
statistics.
3M TOP 25 PROBLEM EQUIPMENTS
RATIO) {F
I)FI'ERAI.S MAINT
MAINT SIIIS F011l AC:TIONS
AC(TrNS IEI''ING. PAll'S/ASSS'r ToSIII".v
'I l r. FAI.
.AIl., I)T
PAItl'S MAN S I A'rs IIItllIlS
COSTS IltmillsN 2 frlt a' (TIIl()OS)
I '1Iill l Fie :in, 15005 .139 2554/4955 34.2 14890897 211160 6599 5360.4
2 '1'"01 i ilh l'ressure Air Systenis 11643 460 1801/3360 25.3 4299666 17,1771 ,1668 2551.0
3 TFu3 Intermedialte & Lw Pressure Air Systems 11111 501 1893/3124 22.2 3305809 114372 4171 2519.8
4 F1101 Maill Steamnn Boiler 16156 226 1127/7922 71.5 22419661 389131 64127 ,17.11.8
5 GVO) NI(K 15(l'halanx) Close-In Wcapon System 10725 249 3:320/9,7 43.1 17623148 1100641 . 118 1112.6
6 T.10 I Chilled Water Air Conditioning System 6879 367 1255/1868 18.7 1714608 122928 3329 2356.1
7 Tl)K03 Low Pressure Distilling Plant 6777 330 999/2361 20.5 1421427 13945.1 2911 1997.0
8 1505 I.ighting Fixtures, Permanent Mount 9629 408 1675/924 23.6 762750 91203 3308 2529.4
9 AD01 Doors 9063 425 1312/3837 21.3 661498 9101.1 5379 5709.1
10 T806 Sen Water Service System 5559 445 783/2287 12.5 1875107 81716 2-155 2052.5
11 310C 60 Iz Steain Turbine Generator Set 6514 312 642/2677 20.9 1145790 134751 2193 1614.1
12 '605 Fueling Service. Transfer & Blending 5337 291 844/1233 18.3 3595495 67936 2601 2326.8
13 F303 Centrifugal Pump Unit (Multistage) 4727 207 .150/1914 22.8 2839558 103592 1977 1012.5
1.1 T70(i Piping & Valve Group 5069 412 6;96/2058 12.3 683508 66718 2861 2502.4
15 13101 )ieel Engine 5601 151 (i93/2883 37.1 1796569 77271 2200 1276.0
16 T'3B0 Fresh Water Cooling Systems 4894 381 954/1618 12.8 858869 55088 1881 1252.7
17 1TB03 Pure Water Systenl 4795 392 1005/1096 12.2 835177 58933 19:31 1466..1
18 F101 Air Supply System Blower Group 3475 194 278/1653 17.9 898113 61717 1621 1157.h
19 TA01 Trim & Drain System .1062 391 118/1661 10.4 1311219 51261 1757 1277 1
20 1TI1103 Sulpply System, Shore Steann 4206 350 176/1905 12.0 669558 55398 1!995 1368.;
21 'r503 lefrigeraton Plantl1t-12 D)ir Exp) 4165 437 845/1054 9.5 88899.1 6G1618 17-17 1231.2
22 3301 60 ilz Diesel Engine DVN Generator Set 4152 298 .1-12/1863 13.9 851622 8.1219 1208 716.(i
23 3101 60 llz Diese i Engine Genernator Set 4239 197 543/1994 21.5 P90515 60416 15.1.1 754.6
21 OSr10 Al. (Conditioning System (11-111 CWP) 4097 210 716/1094 19.5 793352 59368 1478 1028.1
25 rTA:l Bilge & lnllnstSystems 3325 392 503/1464 8.5 800172 4747,1 1759 1673.3
*11is collmnl cnlain ilt1 f[ad,,- s hiclh 1lud ma.lenanc nctlo ll. tatli Aumll codes 2 or 3. indicatg thle cilipment w. nnn-nperatinmill ,r operatilgi wilth rrldu-ccd rapabilily
Table 5.2 - Maintenance Data
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POPULATION
An extremely important consideration with regard to impact upon producibility and the
construction cycle is the frequency with which the equipment in question is to be installed.
This criteria can be broken down to ship population, class population and fleet population.
Each takes on a different importance depending on the level of standardization sought. Each
also has a different impact upon the construction cycle.
In the earlier discussion of uniqueness, fleet population was discussed and presented.
Fleet population is particularly important with regard to logistics support costs. Fleet
population is also important with regard to standardizing equipment installation systems across
the fleet.
An equipment type which is utilized frequently throughout the ship is an excellent
candidate for standardization consideration since there is incentive to maximize the use of
common interfaces and installations, work instructions, drawings, engineering and so on. It is
important to plan the acquisition such that the variety of equipment installed on the ship is
minimized as much as feasibly possible.
Class standardization is of importance with regard to both logistics and construction
costs. Clearly there is an advantage in utilizing the same equipment as the lead ship in order to
maximize the savings attributable to lessons learned on the lead ship. Follow ships can also
utilize the same design and structural systems, thereby reducing design, engineering and
construction costs. Logistically, class standardization can result in significantly reduced ILS
costs as well as savings attributable to option pricing and quality partnerships with vendors.
The HEDRS database contains information regarding the frequency of application of a
particular APL within the fleet, a class or a ship. Unfortunately, it is difficult to have HEDRS
simply provide a list of all APL's in the LAPL or equipment category and their associated
populations since HEDRS requires characteristic ranges to be input. If a characteristic field
happens to be blank for a particular equipment, it is not added to the output list. Given that
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there are 99 equipment categories and many LAPL's associated with each, about 1000 HEDRS
runs would be required to generate the lists needed to study population in great detail. Each
run can take 30 minutes to several hours to complete. After the run is finished, the output must
be segregated into data fields readable by a spreadsheet program like Lotus, Quatro Pro or
Excel since HEDRS does not provide output in an easily used format. After that is finished,
the data must be sorted as desired and statistics arrived at for the average ship population per
LAPL. This is an enormous task and given the time constraints on this study, it was not
possible to acquire the data necessary to rank all the equipment categories according to intra-
ship and intra-class standardization. Experience and expert opinions can be used to help guide
decisions, but these statistics must be compiled in order for detailed development to be
possible.
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VFI AND MANUFACTURING LEAD TIME
The time it takes for an equipment to reach the construction site once an order is made
is referred to as the manufacturing lead time. Knowledge of the manufacturing lead time for a
particular item of supply is essential to efficient production planning. In general, reducing
manufacturing lead time is beneficial for those items which are on the critical path and must be
installed in a particular sequence. Reducing the manufacturing lead time for non-critical items
does not necessarily save production time or costs. It is beyond the scope of this research to
pin-point which equipment are on the critical path, but data regarding manufacturing lead times
for equipment was made available from the NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office.
The NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office's (NAVSHIPSO) annual Publication of
Manufacturing Lead Times (MLTPUB) for Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) Ship
Components, Basic Material, and Combat Systems reflects a twelve month projection of
Manufacturing Lead Times (MLTs) of materials normally utilized by shipbuilders performing
Navy related work.41 Each year the report outlines progress in different areas, as well as
listing lead times for the equipment.
The January 1993 report suggested that 12% of HM&E equipment lead times are
expected to decrease in the future, while 11% are expected to increase. Low capacity
utilization and decline in Navy orders will result in a considerable lead time decrease for some
centrifugal castings (brass, steel, and CRES) and a modest decrease for boilers and low
pressure compressors. Work force reductions and order backlog increases will increase lead
times for electric motors, reduction gears and machine tools.
The report lists lead times for both repeat orders and initial orders. It differentiates
between lead times for items ordered to government specs and items ordered to commercial
specs, offering a basis for comparison. The statistics indicate that issue of utilization of
41 NAVSHIPSO; Publication of Manufacturing Lead Times January 1993
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commercial specifications is worthy of further study from the standpoint of shorter delivery
times as well as the other considerations which have been previously mentioned such as
acquisition cost.
Another issue related to manufacturing lead times is the stability of the lead time
Figures over the years. Have lead times tended to drop or increase? NAVSHIPSO provided
some historical trends for selected equipment types and components. It is not possible to
generalize the lead time trends for all equipment, since for some equipment lead times have
tended to decrease, while for others they have tended to increase. Without data regarding the
critical path of a particular shipbuilding project it is difficult to judge the impact of these trends.
Highly fluctuating lead times represent a managerial problem. As was mentioned
earlier in this discussion, long lead times (which are within reason and the scope of the project)
are not necessarily a problem provided that they can be planned for. Highly fluctuating lead
times make the production planning process considerably more difficult. Furthermore,
shortening the lead time on an item which must be scheduled for late installation for other
reasons is not valuable. This is especially true if the vendor delivers the equipment to the yard
earlier than it is needed. Such an arrangement would add storage costs to the shipbuilding
project and increase the likelihood of loss or breakage. Ideally, one hopes for a short lead time
regarding the necessity to notify the vendor, but with a scheme for Just In Time (JIT) delivery
to the shipyard. Insuring that equipment arrives at the yard AS SCHEDULED is important for
the production planning process. While data regarding average lead time was available, data
regarding lead time uncertainty was not. Lead time uncertainty should be a driving
consideration.
The relationship between standardization and manufacturing lead time is unclear. Of
even greater importance is that while manufacturing lead time can be planned for, little design
or planning is possible without the Vendor Furnished Information (VFI) which details critical
dimensions, weights, bolting arrangements and interfaces. Every shipyard surveyed in the
course of this research pointed to the inefficient system associated with vendor furnished or
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other critical information as one of the leading causes of delays and designs which later prove
to be very difficult and costly to produce. VFI delays are the result of a variety of factors. One
of these factors is that some of the equipment procured is engineered for the application. That
is to say, the equipment is not an "off the shelf' commodity, but is built specifically for the
contract at hand.
While the relationship between standardization and manufacturing lead time is unclear,
standardization's impact upon the flow of VFI is more intuitive and understandable.
Standardization of critical characteristics without actually citing a standard source or physical
product would be enough to alleviate many of the problems associated with VFI. The shipyard
would know up front the critical dimensions, bolting arrangements and interfaces necessary for
the design process to take place and incorporate producibility considerations. Until such
industry standards exist, other solutions involving standardization of one form or another can
be considered. Developing a standard design has already been discussed as an option which
would alleviate the VFI problem, but at an often unacceptable cost. As has been mentioned
previously, requiring currently supported equipment to be given preference would limit ILS
cost increases. If this approach were combined with a successful effort to include the critical
information associated with these equipment in a database and made readily available to those
who need the information, designers could develop baselines which had the ability to accept
the majority of the currently supported equipment. Embracing quality partnerships and option
purchase strategies which begin where the FFG-7 strategy left off and take advantage of FFG-
7 lessons learned would also quicken the pace of VFI flow. 42
While MLT data exists, data regarding its importance or impact with respect to the
critical path for ship production does not. For the reasons outlined above, it would be
42 The reader is referred to:
Dickenson, Thomas; "Contractual Aspects for Standardization of HM&E Equipment in Naval Ship
Acquisitions"; MIT SM THESIS; OE DEPT.; May 1993
for a more detailed discussion of partnering as a means to improve the VFI situation
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misleading to rank equipment based on lead time alone. At the time of this writing, statistics
regarding the delivery of VFI and its impact on specific projects was not available.
- 151 -
POTENTIAL ILS SAVINGS
The Naval Sea Logistics Center has established average statistics for equipment
categories regarding population per APL, average number of parts per APL, average number
of new parts per new APL, and average APL proliferation. These average Figures can be used
to calculate procurement acquisition savings potential per year, the cost of provisioning per
year, and the cost of National Stock Number Maintenance per year. Based on these
calculations, the savings potential over a particular time frame can be calculated. It has already
been mentioned that the Navy considers ILS costs to be a substantial problem. Standardization
is one means of reducing this cost.
In the chapter on ILS costs, the NAVSEALOGCEN model was introduced. In this
study, the potential for the equipment categories was calculated using the NPV concept with a
discount rate of 10% and a five year time period. These Figures are somewhat arbitrary but are
adequate for prioritizing the categories.
Figure 5.10 illustrates the results of these calculations. We find that over a five year
period, if all APL proliferation were stopped, 712 Million dollars could be saved. It should be
noted that if NPV was not introduced into the calculation, this savings Figure would appear to
be 940 Million dollars. Appendix A includes these calculations. While the accuracy of the
cost accounting is a matter of debate, the relative ranking of equipment should be adequate as a
means of determining where potential exists. These calculations offer the following list of
twenty equipment categories which represent higher ILS costs. Table 5.3 lists these
candidates. It should be noted that the data is from 1992, and all values are in 1992 dollars.
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ILS COST SAVINGS POTENTIAL
49 - CARBURETORS
51 - ISOLATORS
74- EDUCTORS
56 DAVITS
73 - EJECTORS
63 - WINDLASSES
59- ELEVATORS
94 - ASW EOUIPMENT
04- CONDENSERS
09- BATTERY CHARGERS
08 - DISTILLING PLANTS
37- BEARINGS
85 - DECK MACHINERY
39-CLUTCHES
24 - UGHTING RXTURES
62- WINCHES
07- HEATERS
76 - PURIFIERS
50- PANELS
48 - FILTERS
61 - CONTROL EOUIPMENT
69 - GEARS AND REDUCERS
16- GENERATORS
01 - PUMPS
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Figure 5.10 - LS Cost Savings Potential
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01-Pumps
66-Engines
32-Refrigeration Equipment
52-Hydraulic Equipment
16-Generators
88-Valves
17-Motors
05-Turbines
69-Gears and Reducers
64-Firefighting Equipment
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
78-Couplings
27-I/C Equipment
61-Control Equipment
89-FF/Safety/Rescue Equipment
06-Compressors
43-Galley Equipment
48-Filters
95-Yellow Gear
21-Switches
14-Circuit Breakers
Table 5.3 - Top Twenty ILS Candidates
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7)
8)
9)
10)
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TECHNOLOGY TURNOVER - OBSOLESCENCE
Certain types of equipment, such as electronics, become obsolete more quickly than
other types of equipment from a performance standpoint. Other types of equipment become
obsolete from a cost standpoint. Technological advances may lead to new materials which can
reduce the cost of production for components, or may lead to increased
reliability/maintainability. Other technological advances may lead to items with reduced
weight.
The acquisition process must have a procedure in place for contractors/designers to
utilize unsupported equipment if the technology warrants it. A trade-off study must be
facilitated which is as undisruptive and as quick as possible. Even if this trade-off study was
as facilitated as possible, it would still require time. There is an incentive to minimize this
disruption. One option may be for certain types of equipment, which have been shown to be
highly likely to be obsolete or undesirable some time in the near future, not be concentrated
upon for standardization efforts. For these equipment types, contractors should not be
required to follow strict standardization guidelines, since utilizing a supported equipment could
result in the use of an undesirable item or require extensive effort on the part of the contractor
to limit the introduction of APL's for these equipment categories even though after extensive
trade-off studies are performed it is highly likely that the conclusion will be to go ahead and
introduce the new item anyway.
Data regarding obsolescence was not available for this study. This is an important
aspect of the problem and should be pursued in more detail in future work in this area. The
equipment categories targeted by this study should be looked at in this regard if contractors are
to be required to pay close attention to the standardization effort.
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ADAPTIVE COSTS
Adaptive costs refer to costs incurred as a result of the use of a standard or supported
equipment rather than an equipment selected precisely for the particular application. These
costs are more likely to be high in the case of a strict standardization effort in which a standard
is developed or the supply base is actually shrunk rather than merely limited by restricting the
introduction of new APL's. These costs break down into two basic types:
Costs incurred as a result of non-optimum performance
Costs incurred as a result of the use of a "over designed" equipment.
The first of these, non-optimum performance costs, will be a result of extra costs for
running off the optimum point for the equipment and possible extra maintenance or reliability
considerations. Ideally, these considerations would be included in equipment selection
decisions as part of the trade-off process. Furthermore, use of flexible standard mounting
systems or modules would allow production cost and schedule savings to be achieved without
strictly limiting the introduction of new equipment when adaptive costs may be high.
Costs incurred as a result of the use of "over designed" equipment may result more
from an effort to develop standard designs than an effort to limit the introduction of new items
of supply. These costs are a result of higher acquisition costs which may be associated with
equipment designed to higher military specifications than may actually be required by the
application. Such equipment may also be heavier or require more volume.
Adaptive cost data is difficult to acquire. A detailed study of each equipment for each
application on a case by case basis is required for each project. This thesis did not attempt to
quantify the adaptive costs associated with standardization efforts. Qualitatively, the less
restrictive the standardization effort is, the lower the risk of high adaptive costs. This is an
argument in favor of limiting the introduction of new items of supply and requiring intraship
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and class standardization trade-off studies for new ships up front, while limiting focused fleet-
wide standard equipment development (i.e. eliminating items from the supply system and
mandating the use of a standard family of equipment designed or contracted by the Navy) to
extreme cases when maintainability, reliability and performance are deemed to be at high risk.
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PRODUCIBILITY-CRITICAL PATH IMPACT
While many of the aspects discussed so far impact the production costs associated with
ship structural assemblies and installations for the equipment, there are other considerations
which also play a role. In the discussion of manufacturing lead time, the importance of
acquiring information regarding which equipment is on the critical path was mentioned.
Equipment installations may be on the critical path due to location within the ship or other
considerations. Speeding the installation of these equipment is more important than other
equipment because it is the critical path which dictates the schedule. While slack time exists in
other areas, those items on the critical path must be installed at a certain time or the entire
schedule will be impacted. For these reasons, it is important that statistics regarding the
scheduling of equipment installations be developed in order to pinpoint equipment types for
which installation and structural assembly producibility design studies would provide the
greatest benefits. As was already mentioned, knowledge regarding the equipment up front is
the best weapon against needless schedule delays if the knowledge is used to develop a
producible design.
Just as speeding equipment installation is more important for some equipment than
others due to the make-up of the critical path, certain equipment installations are traditionally
more costly than others regardless of the equipment installation being located on the critical
path. It is therefore important to collect statistics regarding the cost of installation for
equipment types. This cost would include design and engineering costs, construction costs,
part travel time throughout the shop and so on. Armed with information regarding which
equipment types are traditionally very costly with regard to their installations, decisions
regarding the development of standard and less costly method mountings, foundations or
modules can be made.
Unfortunately, data regarding timing and costs are not available at this time. Shipyards
are understandably hesitant in releasing this information because they regard it as proprietary.
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Unfortunately, even if they were willing to release all the data they had, it would not be
adequate. The shipyards themselves understand the shortcomings of their cost estimating
capabilities and their knowledge regarding the movement of material throughout the yard and
the timing and costs associated with their processes. The Navy and industry should work
together in gathering this data, as it is beneficial to all involved.
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CHAPTER 6: AN APPROACH TO
PRIORITIZING THE CANDIDATES
Once all the candidates have been individually studied with regard to each of the
criteria, the next task is to prioritize these candidates. A number of criteria have been presented,
each with a prioritized list of equipment associated with it. The task ahead is to conduct a
broad trade-off analysis for all the criteria and candidates. One way of visualizing the situation
is to consider each criteria as having a set of equipment which are highly ranked according to
the criteria. The intersection of these sets represent standardization opportunities which may
save money in more than one way. Equipment which is highly ranked according to all or most
of the criteria may represent better opportunities than others, assuming that no single criteria is
orders of magnitude more important than another.
Figure 6.0 - Criteria Intersections
This approach is adequate when there are few criteria, each having equal importance in
ranking the candidates overall and when one is interested in equipment which are highly ranked
(top 10 for example) on as many criteria as possible. Due to the lack of statistics regarding
some of the more important criteria presented in the preceding chapter, this is the method
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which was used to select a case study to be presented in this thesis. A more rigorous approach
is to use the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP).
AHP allows all the candidates to be ranked and prioritized according to weighted
criteria. The approach organizes complex problems into a multi-dimensional decision matrix,
or framework, as illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 - Decision Matrix
In our case, the goal is a prioritized list of equipment categories. The criteria are those
outlined in the preceding chapter, and the alternatives are the equipment categories themselves.
AHP allows both objective and subjective judgments to be modeled. AHP also has the
advantage of allowing the criteria to be weighted, skewing the prioritization in accordance with
these associated weights. If multiple decision makers are involved, each with its own set of
priorities with regard to each of the criteria, AHP allows the synthesis of all the decision
makers' judgments. A further advantage to many computer AHP systems is that they allow
some uncertainty with regard to qualitative judgments. Rarely are qualitative judgments certain
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or perfectly rational, and a little uncertainty does not hinder the application of AHP. Computer
programs, such as Expert Choice by Expert Choice, Inc., allow some uncertainty and provide
the user with an inconsistency ratio (IR). If the IR is low (below 0.1) then the results of the
analysis are generally acceptable.
Once the goal has been identified, as have the alternatives and the criteria by which to
judge them, these criteria must be weighted according to their relative impact on the
prioritization. Ideally all the criteria could be judged in terms of dollars or time savings, but
this is not possible. Some personal judgment is necessary to rank the importance of these
criteria relative to each other. Differences in opinion regarding these relative weights would
result in different prioritization. While the opinions of a large number of experts have not been
incorporated at this time, it is important to point out that such an incorporation is not difficult
once the information has been collected. The AHP model framework discussed here could be
used in the future once these opinions have been catalogued.
As has been pointed out previously, statistics for equipment categories regarding many
of the criteria were not available at this time. Before a more meaningful and broad analysis can
take place, more information regarding these statistics must be acquired. Furthermore, while
statistics regarding equipment categories were used and presented here, it would be
considerably more accurate and meaningful to do this type of analysis at the LAPL level,
although this would take significantly more time. Rather than present a prioritized list of
equipment categories which may not be accurate and does not reflect many of the more
important considerations, the decision was made to create a case study for a more detailed
analysis based upon an equipment category which showed promise in many areas for which
statistics were available.
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CHAPTER 7: GENERATOR SETS - A CASE
STUDY
A review of the of equipment category statistics presented in Chapter 5.0 will reveal
that the generator equipment category is one of the categories which is worthy of study in
greater detail. Other categories which also show promise include small fittings, Valves, and
lighter electrical items which are used frequently throughout the ship and are also important by
several other criteria. It was decided to present the generator category since it is more easily
associated with other equipment as a system and is therefore a potential candidate for a module
design. Discussions with shipyard personnel also indicated that generator set installation is
one of the more costly and time consuming machinery installations.
The Generator equipment category was ranked highly with regard to potential ILS
savings, uniqueness, APL proliferation and maintenance and reliability concerns. Discussions
with contractors indicated that VFI and Lead Time were concerns with generator sets and that
the installation of these systems was often on the critical path and therefore standardization
would have a potential impact upon producibility. Generator sets may be a candidate for the
ATC program as well. HEDRS was used to study this equipment category in more detail.
The Generator equipment category contains 13 LAPL's. One of these corresponds to
GENERATOR SETS, which were believed to have the greatest potential. Generator sets were
catalogued as having 450 APL's which loosely translates into 450 different items in the supply
system. These 450 APL's were found to have a total of 4373 applications. Each APL can be
further categorized by AC/DC, fuel, turbine and so on. Of these, 290 APL's were associated
with AC Generator Sets.
Using HEDRS it was found that 90% of AC GENSET APL's are installed in
significantly less than 10 ships. Furthermore, 74% of AC GENSET APL's have fewer than
ten total installations in the fleet. We also find that Generator Sets are manufactured in the
United States. The existence of U.S. manufacturers indicates that there is hope for maintaining
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a U.S. industrial base for this technology. Figure 7.0 illustrates the number of ships each AC
GENSET APL is installed in. Figure 7.1 illustrates the total fleet population of each APL.
AC GENSET APL SHIP POPULATION
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After looking closely at the population statistics for Generator Sets, HEDRS also
makes it possible to study the function these APL's perform in order to look for potential
commonality. A scatter plot was created which illustrates RPM vs. KW OUTPUT for each
APL. By studying Figure 7.2, one can look for envelopes of combinations of RPM and KW
for which many APL's are serving the same purpose. These situations should be studied in
greater detail. If several APL's are serving the same purpose, one should ask several
questions:
Is there a good reason for this? Do these APL's represent the same equipment with
only minor modifications? Are different equipment needed to satisfy different
requirements which are not captured in such a simple scatter diagram? In many
cases the answer to these questions will be yes.
Are each of the APL's in the cluster low application APL's or do each have many
applications in the fleet? If there are many applications, it may be less problematic
than if many APL's serving the same function each have few applications.
Observing Figure 7.2, we see that there are areas where a number of APL's appear to be
performing similar functions.
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AC GENERATOR SETS
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Figure 7.2 - AC Generator Sets Scatter Diagram
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One must examine the potential for eliminating APL's from the future supply system by
studying the areas of overlap more closely. While the decision may be made to try to eliminate
this redundancy and commonality, in conjunction with those efforts, data regarding critical
dimensions and VFI should be studied to develop guidelines for standard foundations or
modules which can accept a variety of supportable equipment. It has already been mentioned
that this data is not adequately represented in HEDRS at this time. Data regarding some
generator sets available from two manufacturers was gathered and plotted to demonstrate the
concept of envelopes. Information regarding Wartsila and MAN B&W generator sets running
at 720 RPM and 60 Hz was studied. The data regarding generator set width vs. power is
presented in Figure 7.3 to illustrate that over a specified power range, an envelope of
anticipated dimensions for the manufacturers studied exists. If the majority of anticipated
manufacturers and models for a particular class of equipment was studied in a similar manner
for all critical characteristics, flexible installations could be developed.
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CHAPTER 8: THE MOVE TOWARDS
MODULARITY
Having discussed standardization of equipment piece-parts, equipment and ship
structural details and foundations, the next logical step would be to look at groupings of related
equipment and structure. Opponents of standard products voice the argument that performance
will be degraded through off-optimum design points. While each component has not been
optimized for a particular application, as a system the final product can meet customer
requirements at lower costs. Furthermore, flexible design and production approaches can
provide a great deal of customization of these baseline modules. This concept, the production
of custom products from common building blocks and processes, is often referred to as "mass
customization".4 3 There are many examples of successful mass customization in a variety of
industries.
Mass customization is a response to the realization that consumers no longer want mass
produced products. As communication has become easier and faster, and changing customer
requirements come streaming into the office, product life cycles have decreased with
consumers expecting their requirements to be embodied in the design of the products they buy.
Another important point is that many industries have matured to the point where the machinery
involved in its production could be purchased by many other companies in many other
countries. Completely standard end-products are easily reproduced by completely standard
and common machinery. This led to countries with low wage rates having the upper hand.
Furthermore, because manufacturing was new to these up and coming companies, they did not
43 The term "mass customization" was coined by Stan Davis in his book, Future Perfect. The concept
was studied in greater detail by B. Joseph Pine II in his MIT Leaders for Manufacturing thesis
(1991) and his subsequent book:
Pine, B.P.; Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition; Harvard Business
School Press; Boston; 1993
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suffer from the same paradigms and bureaucracy of U.S. firms. They saw an opportunity not
only to compete on wage rates, but also to refine the manufacturing process to reduce cycle
times and construction costs. U.S. firms are faced with no choice but to compete by
streamlining manufacturing processes and to provide what the customer wants, when the
customer wants it. Shipbuilders have always been faced with customers who demand a
highly specialized product. For the U.S shipbuilders to compete, they must achieve the goal of
producing ships which meet the customer's requirements and can be built quickly and
efficiently. This can be accomplished by employing flexible manufacturing systems, standard
processes, baseline designs and standard interim products (modules) utilizing equipment and
supplies acquired through effective agreements with vendors which can be adapted to a
particular requirement or mixed and matched to produce a product which the customer sees as
meeting their needs.
"The best method for achieving mass customization - minimizing costs while
maximizing individual customization - is by creating modular components that can be
configured into a wide variety of end products and services. Economies of scale are gained
through the components rather than the products; economies of scope are gained by using the
modular components over and over in different products; and customization is gained by the
myriad of products that can be conFigured." 4 4
Karl Ulrich of MIT's Sloan School has done significant research into discrete product
modularity. Karl Ulrich has developed a typology which classifies six types of modularity.4 5
This classification system is described in Mr. Pine's book, and those types which are relevant
to this discussion follow:
44 Pine, B.P.; Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition; Harvard Business
School Press; Boston; 1993
45 Mr. Pine's descriptions are based upon:
Ulrich, Karl; Tung, Karen; Fundamentals of Product Modularity; working Paper #3335-91-MSA,
Sloan School of Management, MIT, September 1991
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Component-Sharing Modularity refers to the same component being used across
multiple products to provide economies of scope. This form of modularity is useful in
controlling a proliferating product line whose costs are rising even faster than the number of
products. This type of modularity reduces costs while permitting variety and faster end-
product development. One example of this type of modularity is found in General Electric's
program to reduce the costs associated with its circuit breaker production by replacing 28,000
unique parts with 1,275 components shared across 40,000 different circuit breaker box
designs.4 6 Another example of this type of modularity can be found at Komatsu, a heavy
equipment manufacturer which found its costs increasing dramatically throughout the 1970's
as its product variety increased to meet the challenges of different markets throughout the
world.4 7 Komatsu chose to standardize several key modules which could be shared across its
product lines. They found that this successfully allowed them to provide a variety of products
which met their market needs. The Navy's Affordability Through Commonality initiative is an
example of a plan which will utilize component sharing modularity in Navy ship design and
production, as evidenced in the ATC Policy Statement:
"Naval ships will be designed and built using common modules
comprised of standard components andlor standard interfaces. These modules
will be used across ship types and will be integral with standardization, zonal
systems architecture and generic build strategies.
This policy of increased commonality is intended to reduce the total
cost of ownership and is the cornerstone of the affordable fleet." 48
46 Mr. Pine's cited example is based upon:
Dumaine, Brian; "How Managers Can Suceed Through Speed," Fortune, February 13, 1989
4 7 Mr. Pine cited this example from:
"Komatsu: Ryoichi Kawai's Leadership," Case #390-037 Harvard Business School
48 Bosworth, CMDR; cover letter accompanying the report:
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The ATC program is the Navy's latest standardization and modularity effort. It is
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Cut-to Fit (fabricate to fit) Modularity refers to a system in which one or more of the
"standard" components is variable within pre-set limits. One example of this type of
modularity can be found within a subsidiary of Matushita of Japan, the National Bicycle
industrial Co.4 9 Matsushita provides its customers a bicycle tailored to their individual needs
through the use of flexible modules. They are capable of producing 11,231,862 variations on
18 basic models in 199 color patterns. The customer provides the shopkeeper with preferences
and key dimensions, which are then entered into a computerized database which searches for
the appropriate components, generates the construction drawings and work instructions and
numerical control which is then sent on to a highly automated production system. Skilled
workers then assemble the finished components, perform any necessary custom detailing and
send the final product on to the customer. In ship production, where customers have
historically demanded customization, the ideal of fabricate to fit modularity should serve as a
model and basis for continued research and development.
Bus Modularity refers to a standard interface system which allows different
components to be quickly assembled. The automobile industry has taken some advantage of
bus modularity. GM has utilized a modularized body and variety of components which
quickly attach to a basic chassis and wiring harness. Both Chrysler and Ford are making
headway in this area. Nissan is looking at taking the concept even further utilizing a variety of
modularity concepts to produce custom cars. In ship production, bus modularity is a more
A Strategic Plan for the Affordability Through Commonality Project; December 1992; Decisions and
Designs, Inc.
49 Moffat, Susan; "Japan's New Personalized Production," Fortune; October 22, 1990
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complex issue which is not easily recognized as a possibility within the traditional structural
paradigm. Research into the Generic Build Strategy (GBS) concept represents a step in this
direction. GBS represents an attempt to define a production approach for a particular ship type
which serves as a baseline production plan which can be used to facilitate efficient production
of a ship in a variety of shipyards. The Navy has looked into the GBS as a means to reduce
construction times for its ships within the same class which are produced in a variety of
shipyards. In the future, the technology may be available to utilize structural systems which
emphasize quick assembly and allow equipment to be method mounted5° directly to these
novel structural systems for primary ship structure.
Sectional Modularity refers to the configuration of a number of standard components in
arbitrary ways through standard interfaces. Lego toy building blocks and the many similar
systems are an ideal example of this approach. While bus modularity stresses the quick
attachment of standard components to a standard structural system, sectional modularity
removes the need for the primary structural system by incorporating it into the components
themselves, which then can be assembled together. The engineered panels produced by Balley
Engineered Systems are an example of a system which incorporates sectional modularity.5 1
Balley utilizes a pre-engineered panel to create a dramatically wide variety of end products such
as refrigerated warehouses, environmental rooms, and walk-in coolers. Balley has developed
a single process which is capable of forming a variety of panel types and geometries. Vibtech,
Inc. has researched a ship structural system concept which incorporates a similar panel
construction approach which would facilitate method mounting attachments directly to the
panels themselves through the use of standard method mountings. While it may be difficult to
envision an entire ship taking advantage of sectional modularity at this time, one can envision
50 Method mounting refers to the use of a standard interface which emphasizes quick assembly, such as
double flux studs
5 1 Pine, B.P.; Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition; Harvard Business
School Press; Boston; 1993
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zones made from standard components which fully define a three dimensional space and
provide standard structural interfaces and input and output interfaces for electrical and fluid
distributive systems for many parts of the ship.
Many of the companies which have taken advantage of these concepts have discovered
the added advantage of reconfigurable products. Products can be easily recycled or
reconfigured at the customer's request. Computer manufacturers provide upgradability
through bus modularity. Nissan is exploring the "evolving car" concept which would permit
owners to bring their car in to be quickly upgraded or customized. Similarly, these approaches
could provide shipowners with a ship which could be more efficiently reconFigured to meet
changing requirements. A tanker owner, for example, could have a ship built at a yard and
know ahead of time that it could be expanded or shortened and still provide adequate
performance, stability and essentially be pre-approved by a classification society. With all of
these concepts, it is important to know what the customers or market want. The Navy's
Variable Payload Ship (VPS) concept is another example. VPS is discussed in more detail
later.
Different ship types may be broken down into obvious zones. For example, a tanker
may be broken down into its machinery space, accommodations space, the stern and steering
gear, propeller shafting and housing, bow/forecastle, tank compartments and the deck and its
associated machinery. This approach is not new. It has been used successfully in this country
towards the development of standard designs and design families in the past and is currently
used in other countries like Japan and Germany.
The Bethlehem Steel Corporation produced a standard family of tankers in the 1960's
and 1970's.52 In the late 1950's a series of 12 identical 35,700 DWT tankers were built for a
variety of owners. They offered few options with these ships, but for all practical purposes
52 Gallagher, Neil; "Commercial Substitution as a Means to Build the Industrial Shipbuilding Base";
MS Thesis, MIT Ocean Engineering, 1993
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the products were identical. In the 1960's the market changed and larger tankers were
demanded. A 62,000 DWT tanker was developed based upon the earlier ship. The major
difference was a new and more powerful propulsion plant and a lengthened and deepened hull.
The same machinery was used when possible, and when that was not practical, the same prior
vendors were used. The overall layout of the ships was kept identical. Three of the 62,000
1DWT tankers were built, and then the size was increased further to 70,000 DWT by adding
tanks at the parallel midbody. Six of these ships were built. The trend towards larger tankers
continued and Bethship saw a demand for 120,000 DWT vessels, of which four were built. In
this case more powerful propulsion plants were installed in an identical engine room. Again,
the ship was a lengthened version of the previous ship, but with a new bow design. In the
early 1970's the largest ships of the "series" were built at 265,000 dwt. Bethship successfully
employed the modularity concept, although in the beginning of the process it is not clear that
the outcome had been envisioned. They were able to keep their engineering cost low through
the repetitive use of baseline designs. Production costs were kept low through the repetitive
use of standard components and processes. Relationships with the vendors provided lower
acquisition costs and timely delivery. Use of the same or similar equipment and sole source
vendors further simplified the engineering and design and assured customers of significantly
reduced logistics and life cycle costs, especially for those customers who purchased a number
of ships. While this success story illustrates the feasibility of the concept, planning for the
variety of ships up front would provide even greater benefits and allow the shipyard to develop
an optimum strategy for building the ships. Detailed planning, the application of new
technology and a move closer to the ideal of "mass customization" would provide true
flexibility and a final product tailored specifically to the customers needs.
While the general approach to looking at natural ship divisions is not new, advances in
manufacturing processes and procedures and a better understanding of production have
sparked renewed interest in the approach. Recognizing that a shipyard is generally not in
control of wage rates and material costs, but does have some control over labor hours,
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component transport times and throughput rate, there is an incentive to adopt a design and
production approach which emphasizes production improvements.
Conventional outfitting, or the planning and implementation of production plans which
were functionally based (i.e. a system would be installed at a particular time, even if it was
distributive and located in a variety of places throughout the ship), inevitably leads to delays
and interferences between trades as discussed earlier in this thesis. Conventional outfitting
stresses on-board installation of each piece-part which is the reason it is so inefficient. Even
so, conventional outfitting does have an advantage with regard to accuracy control
requirements. Since final assembly of parts did not occur until they had been brought to their
installation location, final adjustments could easily be made to insure that they fit. By contrast,
pre-outfitting stresses the outfitting of large structural sections or pallets within a shop prior to
erection onto the hull block. While this is a more efficient system, it places more stress on the
planning function. Furthermore, it places stricter requirements on tolerances. Since the outfit
package is being built in the shop according to the ship's drawings rather than at the installation
site, it is important that the final product (the package and the structure to which it is to be
attached) actually match the drawings. While smaller work packages can be built which have
some extra material at the interfaces to be trimmed at the site to suit, this trimming process
requires time and effort. Clearly, accuracy control is worthwhile if it can be achieved at a cost
below the expenses associated with the additional re-work necessary to make an inaccurate
piece fit. Accuracy control becomes an even more important issue as the size of the modules
increase, becoming more influential to the overall ship structure. In the earlier section on
standards as benchmarks in Chapter 2, the necessity of compiling statistics regarding variations
in an effort to develop tolerance standards was discussed. In Chapter 2, variations discovered
in the FFG-7 class of ships were presented. These statistics indicate that modules must be
designed not only to allow flexibility with regard to equipment, but with regard to integration
with the ship as well.
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Zone outfitting refers to an approach in which everything within a pre-defined three
dimensional space is planned and outfit based upon its location rather than its system. Zone
outfitting was discussed in more detail in the overview of standardization in shipbuilding.
Clearly, the planning required for this approach is significantly more involved than that
associated with a systems based approach. This is due to many factors, one obvious issue
being that at some point during the design, all the systems are defined as systems by the very
nature of their individual design processes. Inevitably they will be tested and operated as
systems. Zone outfitting requires another set of drawings and instructions to be developed
based upon location, rather than system. As the system design progresses or changes, these
zone drawings and production plans must change with them. This is an important point most
of all for distributive systems, which as the name implies are spread throughout the ship. It
has been shown in many other studies that the potential savings of such an approach generally
merits the up front planning costs.
Modularity is more easily and obviously applied to commercial ships, and these will be
discussed to introduce the concept. Traditionally, the first major milestone in this approach is
to determine the ship types and sizes for which major patterns/panels could be developed for
each of the obvious zones as outlined above. This is essentially a market trend issue. One
wants to concentrate effort on ship types and sizes which will be marketable. It is important to
incorporate as much flexibility into the designs as is feasibly and economically possible to
allow them to easily be applied to unforeseen applications. Ideally one would like to develop a
set of common building blocks from which custom and highly specialized products could be
developed. This is especially true in the shipping industry, in which shipowners often demand
specialization if they can get it at a reasonable price.
After a market survey has been completed, the results are then used to define an
envelope of anticipated customer requirements for the targeted ship types. This envelope
would define such things as speed ranges, size (cargo) ranges, and other major gross
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characteristics and constraints. Figure 8.0 illustrates a notional example of how basic ship
variations can be used to cover such an envelope of requirements.
o 5 10
Figure 8.0 - Base Ship Variations 53
Figure from the short course on Advanced Ship Production, Professional Summer at MIT 1992
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After defining the envelope of requirements which are to be satisfied by the "standard"
series, the next task is to define major design elements which can be adjusted and "mixed and
matched" to fill the requirement envelope. For example, a flexible standard series of stern
propulsion units could be developed which cover the range of power required to propel the
anticipated ship types and configurations. The concept of a standard propulsion plant is not
new, and is currently being looked at closely by Wartsila Diesel. Wartsila is marketing its
expertise and capability to develop and produce propulsion modules ranging from palletized
systems to entire stern modules. The company has recently signed an agreement with the
Babcock and Wilcox company in an effort to bring together the expertise and manufacturing
capability necessary to develop, produce and service propulsion and generator set machinery
and modules which they hope to see utilized in U.S. Sealift construction as well as future
commercial construction. Wartsilla developed the PROPAC fully integrated propulsion system
module. Now they hope that, together with Babcock and Wilcox, they will develop and build
complete ship propulsion modules with all machinery and controls in place ready to be
delivered to shipyards anywhere in the world. They are also willing to manage the building of
these modules at the shipyard itself if this proves to be advantageous for the yard.
Associated with each of these propulsion modules could be accommodation space
modules which correspond to the crew sizes anticipated for the propulsion modules and their
associated ship types. Tank compartment and/or container hold modules could be developed.
A set of bow/focsle modules could be developed which ideally would be applicable to all the
anticipated ship types. It is likely that these modules would need to be not only "stackable"
lengthwise at the parallel midbody, but would need to be expandable to adjust the ship's beam.
One option for accomplishing this is through the use of a variety of wing tank modules. This
could be necessary for a variety of reasons, stability and straight/canal requirements being
some of them. This would also allow cargo capacity to be a function of both length and beam
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rather than length alone. This would facilitate satisfying the envelope of anticipated customer
requirements.
An effective shipbuilder may have several standard arrangements, or patterns and
panels, in a computerized library from which new ship designs could be developed. All the
production planning and estimating would be developed for these baseline designs as described
in the earlier overview of standardization. For example, several "standard" machinery
arrangements may be on call for different propulsion requirements. This would be tied
together with a database of preferred equipment. As equipment was selected, the standard
arrangement would become more detailed to adjust for any differences in equipment
dimensions or interfaces. Using the previously described standard task blocks, such an ideal
system would automatically begin the process of describing the work necessary and
developing work packages for completion of the space defined by the arrangement as well as
be capable of detailed cost estimating based on cost data available in the database. Such a
system, when used in conjunction with automated manufacturing processes such as
Computerized Numerical Control (CNC) machines, could have associated with each pattern a
set of programs necessary to run the automated equipment to manufacture the associated parts.
Recent advances in manufacturing and the trend towards Flexible Manufacturing Systems
(FMS) could provide benefits with regard to production time and costs when used in
conjunction with such a database, and still provide the flexibility necessary to produce custom
products (modules) from a standard starting point. While true FMS has been adopted to
varying degrees in a variety of industries, it is still not an entirely mature process. FMS has
evolved from the "production cell" concept, which was itself a move away from the traditional
process oriented shop.
In the traditional method of manufacture, shops were arranged according to process.
This paradigm was very similar to the conventional outfitting outlook which emphasized
function over location. The traditional method of manufacture had the advantage of providing
trained personnel on familiar machines collocated in one space, just as functionally based
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outfitting had the advantage of highly specialized experts working on installing a system very
familiar to them. This generally meant that the specific process being accomplished, drilling or
boring for example, was generally accomplished efficiently. Unfortunately, rarely does a part
or component require a single process. This meant that in a traditional process oriented
workplace, a part or component had to travel throughout the workplace in order to have all the
processes it required accomplished. This transportation time represents a tremendous cost.
Furthermore, it promotes part loss/misplacement. This is entirely analogous to the problems
associated with conventional outfitting. Rarely is a ship system located in one space, and the
time lost in sending multiple trades tracing the system throughout the ship outweighed the
advantages the approach had. The author has seen these problems firsthand in a number of
shipyards. A step away from this traditional and costly approach is the assembly line or
transfer line approach, in which the machinery necessary to accomplish all the tasks associated
with a particular part are arranged sequentially with the part moving from one machine to the
next. While this minimizes travel time, it typically requires the parts being constructed to be
standard in nature and for the machinery to be utilizing many tools specialized for the part in
question. The dedicated machinery can no longer be used for anything else. This is clearly
poorly suited for shipbuilding.
Another approach is the organization of a shop into production cells. Each production
cell would have a number of machines capable of performing the processes associated with a
particular type of component, but the machinery is not dedicated for a specific design. This
approach also minimizes transport time since all the necessary machinery is collocated, but
provides more flexibility. The planning for what type of machinery should be included in a
production (manufacturing) cell should incorporate the "Group Technology" concept. Group
Technology (GT) is defined as a means for improving productivity by classifying parts
according to their common characteristics and production processes. GT began to evolve in
several industries in Europe around the turn of the century. It was not until 1959 that the term
Group Technology was actually used to describe the manual recording and classifying of parts
- 182 -
by production process in card files and catalogues. 54 With the introduction of computers in the
1970's, GT has become widespread in many industries and has, not quite as quickly, been
utilized to some extent by U.S. shipbuilders. By performing this classification function,
statistics regarding the number of parts requiring similar processes are developed. These
statistics should guide the planning of production cells. By performing this function, the
shipyard is able to more effectively distribute the work among its machines and labor. Figure
8.1 illustrates the production cell concept and demonstrates that transport time would be
reduced as compared to the process oriented shop.
54 Kalpakjian, Seropc; Manuacturing Engineering and Technology; Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, MA; 1992; page 1186
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,il
Figure 8.1 - Process Oriented Shop vs. Production Cell Shop5 5
55 Figure from:
Kalpakjian, Scropc; Manuaclturing Engineering and Tcchnology; Addison-Weslcy Publishing
Company, MA; 1992; page 1188
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Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) are essentially a move toward an ideal
automated production cell. FMS refers to a highly automated system, in which similar
products are anticipated to be built on a scale which can justify the set-up costs. With FMS,
the component is automatically carried throughout the production cell or series of production
cells and the machinery in these production cells is numerically controlled. An FMS system
would incorporate Adaptive Control (AC), or the ability for the machine or controller to
automatically adjust to changing operating conditions or mishaps. While the FMS approach is
not entirely mature, the production cell approach with varying degrees of automation has been
used successfully throughout many industries, including shipbuilding.
IHI of Japan has a system in place which takes advantage of some of these modularity
concepts, and has been using it in ship designs since 1987. IHI's Future-Oriented Refined
Engineering System for Shipbuilding Aided by Computer, or FRESCO, integrates standard
modules and arrangements with information regarding availability of equipment. 56 It also
produces drawings and production planning information as described in the discussion of
production planning standards. For example, collections of fittings to be assembled separate
from the hull structure as outfit units are represented by machinery and piping dimensions
which are frequently encountered, but these dimensions are automatically updated once the
actual equipment has been selected from the database. The output includes material definitions
and work instructions for pipe-piece and outfit unit assembly work, and this information is
linked to the benchmarks which estimate man-hour requirements. As of February 1991,
seventy modules were implemented in FRESCO. Even more (150) are expected to be available
in the near future and will include classifications such as equipment modules and piping
modules. Human engineering aspects could be integrated into the program such that
appropriate clearances are generated for walkways, handrails, controls and displays.
56 Chirillo, Louis; "Flexible Standards: An Essential Innovation in Shipyards"; Journal of Ship
Production; Vol. 7, No. 1; Feb 1991, pp. 1-11
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These standard arrangements represent modules and zones. There is an opportunity to
identify modules and zones which may be applicable to a range of ship types. Figure 8.2
Illustrates this modular approach. By studying equipment characteristics, and moving
progressively from a single item to an item and its associated equipment, modularity begins to
take shape. The criteria developed for evaluating equipment standardization would also be
applicable at the module level.
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Data is available regarding the difference in costs associated with two fleet oilers built at
Avondale. The AO-177 class was built using conventional outfitting methods. The T-AO 187
class was built using the modular approach. Table 8.0 compares the two.
Table 8.0 - Comparison of Modular and Traditional Construction57
As the table shows, there is an increase in pre-planning time which leads to significant
reductions in production costs (38% to 15%).
The fine hull forms of naval combatants and the lack of commonality of compartments
within the ship (and little parallel midbody) pose challenges to the development of large zone
modules for naval combatants. However, large modules could be developed if the Navy were
willing to move in this direction and accept the associated loss of hullform flexibility. The use
The table is from a set of illustrations used in a NAVSEA presentation on commonality.
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AO-177 T-AO 187
ENGINEERING
Number of Drawings 1417 1844
Man-hours/DWG 1.0 0.90
Man-hours 1.0 1.17
PRODUCTION
Hull Steel 1.0 0.72
Piping 1.0 0.78
Machinery Installation 1.0 0.80
Coating 1.0 0.85
Sheetmetal Installation 1.0 0.82
Electrical Installation 1.0 0.85
Relative Construction 1.0 0.85
57
of smaller modules may be more feasible and provides a greater degree of flexibility with
regard to hullform. This concept is not new and was used extensively during World War II. It
should be noted that the Navy has had considerable success with modularity for submarine
production. This is largely due to the historical emphasis of tight tolerances for submarine
work and the existence of parallel midbody. It should also be noted that the Navy has already
modularized weapon systems to a large extent. Many weapons systems are contained within
defined envelopes with standard interfaces to facilitate quick removal and upgrade. This
advance was in response to quickly changing technology and ships taking full advantage of the
system are referred to as Variable Payload Ships (VPS). The first application of this concept is
on the DDG-51. Figure 8.3 illustrates the VPS concept. The VPS concept separates the
weapons systems from the rest of the ship, referred to as the platform. The ship is designed
such that the weapons systems can be installed/replaced after the construction of the rest of the
ship has been completed. This concept ties into the Generic Build Strategy concept. VPS has
several benefits. Construction time should be reduced, since installation of the weapons
systems which usually have high lead times and problems associated with them has been
removed from the critical path for the platform. The weapons systems should be easier to test
at a standard facility, which should reduce testing time and complications. Finally, the
weapons system mix of the ship can be more quickly revised or varied to more accurately
match foreseen mission requirements. Clearly this is a move towards the Mass Customization
concept for naval combatants.
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Figure 8.3 - Variable Payload Ship58
Tibbits, Prof. B.F.; prcscntation cnitlced "MODULARITY"
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Just as standard foundations and modules for HM&E equipment require statistics
regarding dimensions, VPS utilizes statistics regarding combat systems. The zones designed
into the platform to accept the combat modules are designed with service capacities intended to
be capable of powering the most demanding module foreseen. The zones and modules take
advantage of standard mountings, attachments and interfaces. Several standard module sizes
were developed based on combat system statistics. This is illustrated in Figure 8.4.
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It should be noted that Navy module design is further complicated and constrained by
the need for the modules to be easily produced and erected in a variety of shipyards. While an
individual shipyard designing and building a commercial ship can size and design its modules
to take full advantage of the shipyard's facilities, Navy modules must be developed based upon
typical or lowest anticipated shipyard capacities. Table 8.1 illustrates this problem with
Figures regarding lift capacity for a number of major U.S. shipyards. As can be seen,
capacities vary significantly. This variation is another reason for concentrating upon smaller
modules for Navy construction. Larger module designs would need to be easily subdivided
and assembled by yards with lower capacities if the Navy would like to be able to build its
ships in most U.S. shipyards. This problem has important political and legal implications. If
the Navy designs large modules, they will be accused of favoring larger shipyards like
Newport News. Yards like Newport News, on the other hand, would like to utilize larger
modules since they have a competitive advantage in this area and may be resistant to efforts
emphasizing smaller subassemblies. It should be noted that if the modules are designed such
that they may be assembled into larger sub-assemblies and then erected onto the ship, yards
with larger crane capacities can still take advantage of them effectively.
................ I METRIC TONS 
BRIDGE LUFFING REVOLVER TOWER MOBILE GANTRY
SHIPYARD CRANE DERRICK CRANE CRANES CRANES CRANE
ALABAMA SHIPYARD 275 1400
BATH IRON WORKS 220 220
BETHLEHEM STEEL 91 & 45
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING 182 54 
MARINETTE MARINE 4 5 220 l
MOSS POINT 159
NASSCO 159
NEWPORT NEWS 45 900 315
TAMPA SHIPYARDS 800 
Table 8.1 -Representative Shipyard Lifting Capacities
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The VPS concept, while new to the U.S., has been used successfully for many years
by the German shipyard, Blohm & Voss. They have designed ships, ranging from patrol craft
to frigates, which accept a variety of standard weapons payload "containers" (modules). This
MEKO concept has resulted in ten deployed ship platform designs which Blohm & Voss
markets. The 76 mm OTO Melara Compact Gun weapon container has been used successfully
since sea trials of the module integrated with the Federal German Navy destroyer Z4 were
conducted in 1975.
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AFFORDABILITY THROUGH COMMONALITY PROGRAM
The Navy is currently studying the opportunities discussed so far as part of its
Affordability Through Commonality Program. The stated goals of the ATC program are to
improve the process by which the Navy designs, acquires and provides lifetime support for its
ships. ATC builds on the current success within the Navy and learns from the experience of
other industries and other Navies. ATC recognized early on that while design costs are only
2% of total ship life cycle costs, it is this 2% which locks in the other 98%. ATC decided to
study how the design process and resultant proposed designs impact upon producibility,
supportability and upgradability and use this insight to develop means to positively impact
these costly aspects of the ship life cycle. The ATC effort began in 1992 with a survey of
other industries and how commonality was utilized as a means of reducing their costs. The
survey included representatives of the aerospace, communications and electronics, utilities,
industrial products and shipbuilding industries. This survey served to provide suggestions
about how the Navy might reduce cost and improve schedules. Table 8.2 provides a summary
of industry techniques revealed during the industry survey. The results of this survey are
consistent with the information gathered during the course of this research.
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TECHNIQUES BENEFITS
INDUSTRY COMPANY STANDARDIZATION SIMPLIFICATION CONCURRENT COST SCHEDULE QUALITY
ENGINEERING
Aer~ospace' McDonnell- * Mu~tbt~on * 60% sawgss on b * 18 mon reducDton Scrap reduced 58%
Aerospace, McDonlul cr fsCOS for selected of deslgn te for · Rework reduced 29%
proecs one arcratt design · Non conlormance reduced 38%
proect · Weld defect reduced 70%
Engineenrng cianges reduced 68
Boeing Ballistic * Eiminate mginal * Product · 30% below bd * Materal lead ie
SysBecms )lavusn vtu-added devlopment team prce reduced 30% Matenal shortages reduced to 0%
feaimes * 99% defec free operuons
1,096 common
Bem ul kA t plU bcI 757 * 18% equialent fuel
Diuoa d 767 bum savmgs
· Common cew and
_______________________ _____________ su___ _t__
__ AT&rT * Mumiunc team * Cirud breaker * Process time · Defects reduced by 30 to 87%
Commumnecuou * Eaty tage repair cost reduced reduced 40%
eai EuomoflM produclibty 40%
IBM * ttefunc amon mun Assemtby hourn 40% reducon In · Fewer engneenng cnrianges
reduced 45% elecron:s esJgn · Bener prooucikiy
cycle
Wesunghouse * Fewer parts S*iopirt s s Modulr Canstructon me mprove salety
Uuliau N iePo acontruclon * 15 fo 20% savng reduced by 2 years
Div a.a In equipment costs
Commonwealth * Modir * 5 to 10% for most 4 monts savings · Irnprovea over stck-ouln metoa
mEdi cnruclson procte on a 36-month
Industal John Deere Number of dfferent * 60% savLngs n
P suor pw·d 60S * Group olenoog * 30t% sawvngs n develonment te · Inspectors reduced by 67%
P* '"fdmaSiting development coa * Reduced * Proauc lailura e reduced 60%
* Contnuous pros · Manufactunng cost evelopmrnent tme * ScrOrewom reduced 75%
Improvement reduced 42% 35%
Whirpool * Standard packaging Conslated number * 10% productionos
Etrapeaa Deuc.miftent modle smvngs
Lower support coslt
ShipbuilJding Blohm & Voss * Standardized * Zonal aui s * S% rduction In
(MEKO Fngas) weaw ad MME dfstrton * Modar ship cost I year reduction 
· odr Zconstruclton conatruction time
Kvaerner-Masa · Common process * Modr * 50% reduction n Reduction n
Kvaerner-a cCmmonprocessconecon outfftng cost building me Reduced damage
._ _· * POOAC Reduced rework
Table 8.2 - Summary Industry Survey60
60) Cable, C.W; Rivcrs, T.M.; "Affordability Through Commonality," ASNE DDG-51 Technical
Symposium; Sept. 1992
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The results of the ATC survey were further reduced to lists of suggestions, which then
guided the ATC effort. Table 8.3 lists these broad suggestions.
COST
0 Use commercial
specifications and practices
O Steady production
/volumes
O Firm designs or use
standard designs
O Improved procurements
practices
0 Reduce testing
O Less stringent specifications
SCHEDULE
O Use commercial
specifications and practices
0 Larger volume orders
0 More standardization
0 Improved procurement
practices
0 Reduce test and inspection
requirements
0 Simplify designs
Table 8.3 - Suggestions to reduce shipbuilding cost and schedule61
With these suggestions in mind, ATC is intended to employ a three-pronged approach:
* MODULARITY
* EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION
* PROCESS SIMPLIFICATION
Cable, C.W; Rivers, T.M.; "Affordability Through Commonality," ASNE DDG-51 Technical
Symposium; Sept. 1992
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In addition to these stated elements, this study has found that certain other elements exist which
must be emphasized in the formulation of a policy or plan in this area:
LEGAL/CONTRACTUAL ELEMENTS
MILSPEC REVIEW/REVISION
While each of these may be argued to be included within the third prong of the ATC approach,
process simplification, they are each important and complex issues which deserve individual,
rather than broad, emphasis.
The author agrees with the members of the ATC team that finding solutions to the
affordability problem will require an understanding of all these elements and their interactions.
No single element can provide benefits without skewing problems towards another direction or
set of directions. The elements must be studied together in order to arrive at a balanced
approach which does not merely replace problems, or create more problems than it solves. For
example, equipment standardization is a means of achieving reduced integrated logistics
support costs and more rapid ILS response because it allows the Naval Sea Logistics Center to
reduce inventory breadth and increase inventory depth; i.e. they no longer need to track as
wide a variety of parts and would then have the capacity and resources freed to assure a greater
probability of the availability of a part for those that are still being tracked. It has also been
shown that equipment standardization has certain drawbacks or costs which may make it
undesirable for certain types of equipment. It has also been shown that standard interfaces and
readily available VFI are necessary for speeding the construction cycle; standard equipment
designs are one way of achieving this, but are the least flexible way of doing so. For these
reasons, the goal of reduced ILS costs must also be studied outside the context of equipment
standardization. The ILS processes must be streamlined in an effort to reduce the costs
associated with the ILS function per tracked part, independent of an effort to reduce the
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number of tracked parts. Significant gains are likely to be found in this area, and that insight
may change the view or requirements for equipment standardization. We can define flexible
modularity as the design of a module which can accept some variation within it but provide
standard interfaces and envelope dimensions. Flexible modularity provides the up front
information and interfaces necessary for reducing construction cost and construction cycles,
but does not impact the ILS function in a significant way unless the use of standard or
supported equipment within the module is also addressed. Even after all the issues discussed
above have been considered, the legal and contractual aspects of the plan could limit its
success. Several key questions require answers for a Navy designed and driven modularity
program to be embraced by the U.S. shipbuilding community. Some of these include:
* Are these modules to be built in a separate facility and delivered to the
shipyard? What are the contractual and legal ramifications?
Does the Navy take full responsibility for the performance of these modules,
or are the module designs merely strong suggestions, with the contractor
having final responsibility for their use and performance?
How will the vendors be involved? Are quality partnerships to be employed?
What are the legal roadblocks to such an approach?
It is also important to remember that one of the greatest contributors to high naval
combatant costs are the Milspecs. Stringent requirements and testing procedures add additional
costs to the engineering and development phases, the construction cycle, and the entire life
cycle of the ship. Serious attention must be given to studying these Milspecs and every effort
made to reduce the requirements where possible in an effort to reduce costs. This reduction in
requirements is not intended to be at the cost of performance. Many of the Milspecs may
disallow certain sound engineering practices which at the time of the Milspecs writing were not
fully mature. Such practices which may provide the required performance at a reduced
construction cost should be studied and utilized in the development of ATC modules. The
multi-pronged approach is correct and necessary to insure that an optimum policy, one which
- 198 -
takes the best advantage of all elements at the least cost with the greatest performance, is
developed.
ATC is currently in its planning and preliminary stages. ATC leaders recognized the
necessity to take a multi-disciplinary concurrent engineering approach. Both specialists and
generalists from many segments of the Navy were collocated for the ATC program. ATC's
initial effort was aimed at developing a list of candidate modules to study further. Initially,
ATC focused on the LSD-49 as a baseline ship for studying the impact of ATC initiatives. The
reasoning behind this included the fact that it is representative of near term acquisitions, and it
is sufficiently recent that data is readily available. ATC developed an initial list of module
candidates based upon the following guidelines: 6 2
The module must have multi-class applicability.
The modules must limit APL growth by utilizing supported or standard equipment.
The modules should address fleet maintenance problems.
The systems selected should traditionally have high installation or outfit costs which
modularity might reduce.
Prototype modules should be representative of broad classes of equipment types in
order to maximize gains from lessons learned.
These considerations were used to prioritize a list of candidates for the early case study. The
candidates were initially nominated through group consensus and by looking at some statistics
regarding the associated equipment. From this initial list of 22 candidates, 8 were selected for
further study at that time. Case studies were developed around the selected candidates in an
effort to begin to study the module development process, and the impact these modules may
have upon ship weight, volume and performance. While the LSD-49 was the baseline for the
62 NAVSEA; ATC Modularity Case Study; Feb 1993; NAVSEA Technical Note No. 051-05R-TN-099
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study, future fleet needs were studied and considered in developing the case studies. Along
with future fleet projections, projections of manning levels were utilized in studying the
development of certain modules, such as habitability modules. The results of these studies
provided input for a second, more detailed round of development.
The effort is currently aimed in two simultaneous directions. The first of these is top-
down systems engineering. Top-down systems engineering includes research into generic
build strategies for production process impact, whole ship and whole fleet systems
engineering, and cost analysis tool development and use. It was mentioned in the earlier
discussion of equipment standardization criteria that detailed production cost information is not
currently available. ATC is collecting cost data through contracts with shipyards engaged in
Navy ship production. This data will serve as input to the module selection process and help to
estimate the impact of adjustments to the engineering and production processes. While
NAVSEA is not at the liberty of releasing this data at this time , they do foreseen a time after all
the data has been collected when it will be aggregated to develop cost statistics for general use.
The second aspect of the current effort is detailed engineering and acquisition of
prototype modules. These prototype modules are currently in various levels of development
and include:
Reverse osmosis desalination plant module
HVAC module
Sanitary space module utilizing commercial standards
5"/54 Mark 4 gun module
Just as equipment statistics can be gathered to help guide standardization decisions, the
same type of statistics can be developed to guide the choice of module candidates. The data
required to make decisions regarding modules will include that already collected at the
equipment level. ATC selected candidates for prototype modules based on its study into
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modules which could provide benefits and have application in the near future. The prototype
modules are intended to be a learning experience, since not all the data has been collected to
make more detailed selections. Future modules will be developed based upon lessons learned
and analysis of the data collected simultaneously in the systems engineering research. Figure
8.6 illustrates the proposed ATC module selection process.
Figure 8.6 - ATC Module Selection Process63
Bosworth, M.; Hough, J.; "Improvemcnts in Ship Affordability"; SNAME annual meeting
transactions; Sept 1993
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TRADE-OFF ISSUES
ECONOMICS - SURVIVABILITY
MARGINS · ILS
RMA - REQUIREMENTS
63
ATC recognizes that modularity can take place on many scales. ATC determined that it
should focus its development effort upon palletized equipment modules, which consist of a
main equipment and its auxiliary equipment, or upon small enclosed and densely outfitted three
dimensional compartments like a habitability module. Figure 8.7 illustrates the two types.
An assembly of components
Ranges from palletized
3-D Propulsion Anallary
Assembly
Totally enclosed
3-D Cut-Away of HAB
Module
Figure 8.7 - ATC module size ranges 64
As was discussed earlier, this is a sensible choice of sizes for naval combatants in order
to maintain flexibility with regard to the fine hull forms of naval combatants. With regard to
process streamlining, ATC identified the traditional system oriented sequential design approach
as a key problem. The conventional design approach as discussed earlier does not incorporate
zone production early enough, if at all, in the design process. By the time production feedback
is available, it is too late to incorporate it into the design. Figure 8.8 illustrates the proposed
64 Bosworth, M.; Hough, J.; "Improvements in Ship Affordability"; SNAME annual meeting
transactions; Sept 1993
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ATC integrated design engineering and production approach as compared to the conventional
approach.
INTEGRATED ENGINEERING/
PRODUCTION APPROACH
Sysm Olnred Zon Oreintd Systm Oented.4> ,<~~~
Figure 8.8 - Design Process Revision
While the illustrated approach demonstrates the introduction of the zone architecture
into the contract design phase, it is also important to revise the traditional conceptual and
preliminary design phases. A concurrent engineering approach should be utilized at these early
phases as well, in order to better utilize baseline module designs and producibility
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CONVENTIONAL APPROACH
System Oriented
TEST AND
ACTIVATIOI
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considerations. In conjunction with the proposed inclusion of zone oriented engineering, ATC
proposes to take advantage of the Generic Build Strategy concept. In conjunction with the
GBS research, ATC will look at a reordering of equipment installations and a relocation of
equipment as is practically possible to more efficiently facilitate production.
ATC anticipates that although only basic research is currently available to be used in the
development of the prototypes, at the end of FY 93 more detailed information will be available
and the lessons learned from the prototypes can be used to further refine the process
simplifications. ATC foresees more funding in FY 94 - FY 99 during which time more
modules will be developed.
In conjunction with the ATC effort and the Navy's effort to convert to HFC rather than
CFC Air Conditioning Plants, Bath Iron Works has progressed in the development of an HFC
Air Conditioning Plant package. The scope of the project was to develop an outfit package
which supplied a standard interface for supply and return piping and power cables. This type
of module is representative of the smaller range of ATC modules. It would be a standard pre-
outfit package. BIW's package incorporates associated piping, valves, pumps, strainers and
chillers on a common subbase. The package is intended to be resiliently mounted to ship
structure. Since the package is viewed as a system, the necessity to resiliently mount each of
its individual components to pass shock requirements has been reduced. This will result in the
elimination of 15 resilient mounts per plant. Allowing the equipment to be hard mounted to the
subbase also eliminates many unnecessary flexible couplings. The incorporation of the
associated piping into the plant package reduces labor hours during the expensive outfit stages.
The system also reduces the number of attachments to tank top structure by approximately
50/plant. BIW estimates that the labor savings per plant is on the order of 500 man-
hours/plant.
In developing the package, BIW identified a number of important constraints which
guided their design. The first of these was compartment configuration. Small deck to deck
heights, fine lines for naval combatants which result in sloping and rising tank tops, and highly
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dense confined spaces filled with piping and components all posed challenges to the design
team. The lack of detailed interface planning during the conceptual, preliminary and contract
design phases introduce problems during outfit of ship components. This planning should
include efforts to maximize flange to flange connection of components which eliminates piping
runs and conserves space and weight. This is facilitated by the ability to view the module as a
system which can be shock qualified as such. BIW cited the lack of a proactive effort to
develop standard auxiliary packages for current and future propulsion plants as a constraint.
The use of Milspecs when commercial specs might be suitable was also cited as an expensive
constraint on the design of common modules. BIW also cites the use of expensive materials
vs. low cost carbon steel as a related problem. The necessity to design to "infinite life" flow
rates vs. 15 to 20 year lives drives the costs higher. BIW developed the module incorporating
many of these considerations. Figure 8.9 illustrates the piping arrangements for the proposed
module.
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In summary, modularity efforts face many technical, logistical, legal and contractual
challenges. The standardized modular philosophy impacts design in a variety of ways, both
positive and negative. It is hoped that the reader now has an appreciation for the trade-offs
involved. In general, the savings in production costs should outweigh negative design
impacts. Due to the variety of equipment dimensions, flexible modules would generally need
to be designed to accept the largest reasonably likely equipment dimensions. This requirement
would tend to increase the volume of a ship which utilizes these standard modules as compared
to a fully custom ship. Secondly, arrangement flexibility is more constrained than that for a
custom ship, which also drives volume higher. The extent of the volume increase is not clear.
First of all, while there are a variety of dimensions, it is not a limitless variety. The largest
dimension is not typically orders of magnitude above the mean dimension for the equipment
type. Secondly, the detailed attention and spatial analysis afforded to the module design may
actually result in a more efficiently proportioned system than may have been possible during
the traditional contract design phase. In the contract design of the DDG-51, BIW utilized
envelope dimensions which represented the largest anticipated equipment dimensions in order
to more easily competitively bid equipment. In the detail design phase, arrangements were
modified to incorporate the actual equipment dimensions. It was found that the machinery
room volume decreased by 31% for major machinery from contract to detail design.6 5 This
increase in volume is significant. Had options for equipment been available and dimensions
known up front, redesign and excess volume could have been avoided. While standard
modules would need to incorporate excess volume in order to accept a variety of equipment,
the design of the modules may be more efficient.
Standard module design is also constrained by weight distribution for an equipment
type. A flexible module must support the heaviest likely equipment of the class of equipment,
65 Grigg, L.R; "Standardization of Naval Ship Equipments"; MIT Thesis, MS in Ocean Systems
Management; May 1990
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which in turn would require the use of heavier scantlings than a weight optimized design. This
would lead to a heavier standard module as compared to a custom, weight optimized, design.
Modules which fully define a three-dimensional space, rather than a palletized unit, also tend to
increase weight relative to a custom design further. The three dimensional space is typically
defined by a top, a bottom and four sides. Stacking these three-dimensional units in any
direction results in interfaces which may be twice the required structure as illustrated in Figure
8.10. This poses a technical challenge on the design of such modules. A creative interface
must be developed which provides structural integrity without increasing weight needlessly.
Figure 8.10 - 3-D Space Interface Challenge
It is not clear that these weight increases would be significant. First, shipyards tend to
utilize standard scantlings and shapes in order to minimize inventory costs and the costs
associated with rework. This standardization of scantlings tends to keep the selected scantlings
standard over a range of weights for a given geometry. Secondly, the design process for the
standard module incorporates producibility concepts which are not traditionally taken
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advantage of. This would tend to reduce the weight and cost associated with the standard
module.
Another important point with regard to Navy modules is that the standard module may
in fact weigh less, since the module can be shock tested as a unit. ATC proposes developing
prototype modules which they intend to performance test. This performance testing includes
shock testing. ATC recognizes that the module may behave in such a way that the system
passes shock requirements during testing even though MILSTD-901D might place more
stringent requirements on its design if testing were not implemented. Specifications for shock
tend to increase the selected scantlings associated with foundations beyond the range actually
necessary to support the equipment in a shock environment. Shock stresses are inversely
proportional to the square root of the stiffness (flexibility) of the structural system. Testing the
module as a unit would reduce the required scantlings since the system flexibility would be
fully accounted for. ATC should view this shock testing as an opportunity to prove
producibility concepts and incorporate the lessons learned into streamlined specifications.
Given all these factors, negative design impacts can be offset in many cases and minimized in
most cases.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The objective of this research was to study standardization as a means for reducing the
costs associated with Navy acquisition and construction. The downward trends associated
with shipbuilding work and Navy budgets require action to be taken to reduce the costs
associated with ship acquisition. While the emphasis of this research was on Navy
acquisition, many of the attributable research benefits, especially those in the construction
cycle, are also applicable to commercial design and construction. It is hoped that the author
has successfully provided the reader with an appreciation for the costs and benefits associated
with standardization of equipment, components and modules. Standardization requires many
challenges to be met which were discussed at length throughout this thesis. These can be
summarized as follows:
Decision Systems Challenge: Standardization requires the development of a set of
criteria by which to judge the merits of a particular standardization project
Information Systems Challenge: Standardization requires the development of a
detailed database of VFI and application statistics. This database serves the individual
concerned with logistics, the individual concerned with design and the individual
concerned with evaluating standardization alternatives which have an impact upon
logistics, design and construction.
Technical Challenge: Standardization and modularity imposes a challenge to engineers
and designers to develop flexible designs which incorporate advanced manufacturing
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practices and meet foreseeable customer requirements and can adapt to unforeseen
scenarios. The designs and manufacturing systems must continuously improve while
maintaining critical elements of commonality.
Planning and Procedural Challenge: Standardization and concurrent engineering
require detailed up front production planning which is fully integrated with the design
process. Other elements of the acquisition process must be studied and streamlined in
conjunction with a standardization effort if savings are to be maximized.
Legal and Contractual Challenge: For standardization to be effective, quality
partnerships with vendors must be established and legal/political hurdles (both real
and imagined) must be overcome. This will require a detailed review of the Federal
Acquisition Regulations, the DOD Acquisition Regulations (DOD 5000) and other
pertinent acts, laws and rules. Case transcripts, trial briefs and decisions regarding
representative cases involving these regulations and acquisition policy should be
gathered and studied further to shed light on the situation. In the course of this
research, the following were often referenced as either roadblocks or beneficial:
ROADBLOCKS BENEFICIAL
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 Defense Cat. and Stndzn. Act of 1952
FAR in general FAR Sect. 14 (authorizes econ. eval.)
DOD 5000 regulations
FAR Sect. 16
Table 9.0 - Legal Issues
The list in Table 9.0 is merely a starting point. A great deal of work is needed in this
area.
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Specifications Challenge: Effort must be taken to review military specifications and
options to make them less stringent and producibility "friendly". Effort to substitute
commercial specifications must be studied further.6 6
It has been mentioned that many of the immediate production benefits could be
achieved if common interfaces and mounting methods were available regardless of the
equipment or equipment manufacturer. This is not foreseen any time in the near future in the
United States. The author believes that it is imperative to invest in concurrent engineering and
design up front to incorporate producibility considerations into the design. This should include
an effort to standardize the mountings and foundations of the equipment as a separate but
related effort to the equipment standardization process. Even though equipment may have
differing bolting arrangements and dimensions, it is still technically feasible to create flexible
mounting systems which can accept a variety of equipment as described in this thesis.67
Without detailed production data regarding the costs and time associated with shipyard
processes, it is difficult to determine the economic benefits in a quantitative sense.
It is the current Navy acquisition policy to allow lead ships to be acquired with minimal
effort to standardize across the fleet, save in those cases when performance issues or reliability
concerns are viewed to be critical. Follow ships are required to utilize class standard
equipment when possible, and fleet supported equipment as the next level of preference. Some
effort is being made to standardize within the ship. The Naval Sea Logistics Center has made
progress towards the development of cost trade-off models. These models must be
streamlined, the cost data updated and Net Present Value incorporated. The Navy currently
66 The reader is referred to:
Gallagher, Ncil; "Commercial Substitution as a Means to Bolster the U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial
Base"; MIT Thesis, OE Dept. 1992
67 It was mentioned earlier that Vibtech, Inc. has been studying this problem and offered insights
during the course of this research.
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has an in-house effort to develop common ship modules, but at this time this effort is in its
infancy. The author believes that the policy towards lead ship standardization should be
strengthened to require contractors to utilize fleet supported equipment when possible as is the
case for follow ships. An effort would need to be made to assure that obsolescence or high
costs were avoided, therefore some effort would be required to suggest deviation for these
reasons or to pinpoint equipment or equipment categories for which serious standardization
attention should be given or specifically excused from standardization attention. Quality
partnerships, i.e. option plans, with vendors should be established based on an initial
competition scheme. This competitive process should incorporate service considerations as
well as acquisition costs. Since these would only be options, purchased from a vendor, in the
event that the Navy is unhappy with a particular equipment, a new partnership could be
established at the expense of forfeiting the money spent on the option. Intraship
standardization should be encouraged and required for particular equipment categories which
have been targeted by the Navy for special attention. The Navy already requires a
Standardization Program Plan as part of a CDRL. This plan should be required to be more
detailed, incorporating the suggestions above. The Navy also requires a foundation control
plan from contractors which is to outline the organization and responsibility for meeting shock,
vibration and fatigue requirements. The requirements for foundations should include
requirements for contractors to demonstrate a construction cost control plan which might
outline a process for maximizing producibility and commonality of foundations in the
foundation control plan. Other requirements which lead to higher costs should be reviewed.
Standardization of attachments, mountings and foundations would provide construction cost
benefits and allow for flexibility of equipment. It is clearly an important aspect of an effective
approach to the standardization and module design problem.
There are many types of approaches and incentives which the Navy could offer to
motivate contractors towards these goals. The first "incentive" is to simply make it a
requirement. Many contractors indicated that they actually would prefer in many cases to be
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absolutely required to meet certain standardization goals rather than have incentive clauses.
This would assure them of an even playing field during the bidding process. Many contractors
do not believe the Navy is serious about many objectives which are approached through
"incentives", and do not expect other contractors to consider these goals in their bids. If the
contractor considers the objective and has an associated increase in bid price, it runs the risk of
being labeled a higher bid and eliminated.
The Navy may also choose to offer an Award Fee incentive in the form of a Cost Plus
Award Fee contract. Such a contract would incorporate an amount fixed at the inception of the
contract and an award amount based upon performance of a particular goal. Such an award
may be received in whole or in part depending on the degree of performance. This award
structure is suited best to situations in which the goal or objective cannot feasibly be expressed
as a predetermined requirement and quantitative measurement of performance is difficult, but
improvements in the area are desired. Such a contract imposes an additional administrative
requirement which has a corresponding cost which should be accounted for in considering this
contracting alternative. The FAR also places various restrictions upon the use of such a
mechanism (see FAR 16.3013-3 and FAR 1604.2).68 This approach may be used in
conjunction with a design to cost contract which requires bidders to meet a particular cost
constraint and be compared by the grading of the proposals. While it was outside the scope of
this research to study legal and contractual aspects in great detail, research in this area must be
undertaken if standardization and modularity are to succeed. Research in this area must include
the views and problems faced by shipbuilders, vendors and the Navy.
This thesis presented several classes of statistics which could be used in guiding
standardization decisions. The broad Navy equipment categories were reviewed with respect
to each of these criteria, and potential was demonstrated to exist. For many of these criteria,
68 Biedenbender, Dick;The ILS Manager's LSA Toolkit; McGraw-Hill, INC.; 1993, U.S.
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the data is not available at this time to make adequate decisions. Among the criteria discussed
were:
Redundancy and Commonality
Uniqueness
APL Proliferation
Maintenance Data
Population
VFI and Manufacturing Lead Time
Potential ILS Cost Avoidance
Technology Turnover - Obsolescence
Adaptive Costs
Producibility - Critical Path Impact
Of these, the data which could help to quantify the impact of decisions upon the
construction cycle are either of questionable accuracy, or lacking altogether. This data must be
compiled if decisions are to be based on quantitative rather than qualitative criteria. In the
interim, while hard data is not available, a structured questionnaire could be developed which
uses the expert opinion of shipyard personnel, Navy personnel and vendors to arrive at a
prioritization of equipment with regard to the criteria. These criteria can also be used to help
guide common module design decisions. Once these statistics have been gathered, and
equipment has been studied at a more detailed level than that undertaken in this research, the
expert opinion and quantitative information available from industry and Navy sources should
be synthesized. The Analytical Hierarchical Process discussed in Chapter 6.0 is a tool which
could be successfully applied.
In conclusion, there is substantial evidence that standardization is one means towards
reducing the costs associated with ship design, construction and operation. Standardization is
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an exercise in compromise. In order for standardization to succeed, a great deal of information
is required to adequately make decisions. While standardization is one means towards
progress, it is not the only means. Effort must be made to streamline all of the related
requirements, processes and procedures. A balanced policy for Navy acquisition, and a
balanced general maritime policy for the United States must be established quickly if the U.S.
Shipbuilding Industrial base is to be expected to survive and provide Navy and commercial
ships at competitive rates. Such a balanced policy will require the cooperation of all involved.
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